ARTICLES
The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment
Proofing
Steven L. Schwarcz*
In recent articles in the Yale Law Journal and the Stanford Law Review,
Professor Lynn M LoPucki has sparked much academic discussion arguing
that recent developments in corporate law have led to an erosion in the system
of corporate liability, such that it might one day prove impotent. LoPucki has
argued that transactions such as asset securitizations, sale-leasebacks, and
corporate structures in which liabilities are placed in asset-poor subsidiaries
are driving this change. One early critic to the LoPucki thesis, Professor James
J. White, has argued that empirical data show no evidence of increasing use of
judgment proofing techniques. In this article, Professor Steven L. Schwarcz
joins this debate, arguing that an economic analysis of these transactions suggests that Widespread use of these judgment proofing techniques is unlikely. A
key distinction in the analysis, Schwarcz argues, is between arm's length and
non-arm's length transactions. Arm's length transactions are unlikely to lead
to judgment proofing because corporations will receive value-often cash-for
the assets they sell. It is only by paying out this value in dividends that a corporation begins to judgment-proof itself. The theoretical possibility to take value
away from future involuntary creditors through such transactions will rarely be
realized because of the costs-taxes, negative publicity, personal and criminal
liability-of entering into such agreements. By contrast, in non-arm's length
transactions, corporate owners do have the incentive to create judgment-proof
structures. However, these structures are not innovative, and they will continue
to be well-regulated ex post by existing legal doctrines in bankruptcy, corporate
law, tort law, and criminal law. Following this article are a response from
Professor Lynn LoPucki, a comment by Professor Charles Mooney and a brief
rejoinder from Professor Schwarcz.

• Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law, and Faculty Director, Duke University
Global Capital Markets Center. E-mail: schwarcz@law.duke.edu. The author thanks Bernie
Black, Paul Carrington, Jesse Fried, Elihu Inselbuch, Ken Klee, Lynn LoPucki, Gerry Lynch, Ron
Mann, Steve Nickles, Peter Pantaleo, Eric Posner, Bob Rasmussen, Stephen Scher, Daniel
Schwarcz, Paul Shupack, David Skeel, Tom men, Laura Underkuffler, Todd Z)'\vicki, and the participants in faculty workshops at the University of Pennsylvania (School of Law), Duke University
(Fuqua School of Business), and Wake Forest University (School of Law and Babcock School of
Management) for helpful comments on drafts of this article. The author also thanks William Boyer,
Lyle Fuller, Thomas Loeser, and Eric Schupper for excellent research assistance.

1

2

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

I.

THEDEBATE ...........•.•.•.•.............•.•.•.•.•.............••••••...........•.••••.••••...•..........•.••.••• 4
A. LoPucki ....................................................................................................... 5
B. White ........................................................................................................... 10
II. ANALYSIS ••••••••.•.•.•.•.•.••••••••••.••.•.•.•••.•••••••.••••..•.••••••••••••.•.•.•.••••••••••••••.•.••••••••••••••• 12
A. The Structuring ofArm's Length Business Transactions Should
Not Give Rise to Judgment Proofing ........................................................... 12
B. Arm's Length Business Transactions Are Unlikely to Take
Advantage ofthe Value That Judgment Proofing Would Wrest
from Future Involuntary Creditors .............................................................. 17
C. The Structuring ofNon-Arm's Length Business Transactions Is
More Likely to Give Rise to Judgment Proofing ......................................... 28
D. Regulation ofJudgment Proofing Under Existing Law............................... 32
E. Is Non-Arm's Length Judgment Proofing Adequately Regulated by
Law? ........................................................................................................... 48
CONCLUSION .•.•.••••.•.•....•.•.•••••••.•.•.•.•.•.•••••.•.•.•.•.•••••••.•.••••.•.••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 51

Liability is "one of only two principal means by which governments enforce law."l Yet recent articles in the Yale Law Journal and the Stanford
Law Review assert that liability is dying: "The system by which money
judgments are enforced is beginning to fail. The immediate cause is the deployment oflegal structures that render potential defendants judgment proof'
by bifurcating the ownership of assets from the liabilities associated with
operating those assets in a business.2 These bifurcated structures are made
possible, the argument goes, by computer technology which reduces the
costs of record keeping.3 As a result, business "[j]udgment-proofing strategies have become cheaper and easier to execute"4 and purportedly are becoming more pervasive: "Some large businesses now employ [such judgment-proofing strategies] and market forces are driving their competitors to

1. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 106 YALEL.J. 1,3 (1996) [hereinafter Death of
Liability] (observing that governments enforce law through incarceration for crimes and liability for
civil wrongs).
2. [d. at 4. LoPucki observes that the legal system is being "manipulated by potential defendants to create judgment-proof structures." [d. By 'Judgment proof," I mean that creditors are
losing the practical ability, as opposed to the legal right, to enforce their claims. Accord Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Essential Structure ofJudgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REv. 147, 149 (1998) [hereinafter Essential Structure] ("To own no assets is to be judgment-proof."). I include in this definition
what LoPucki refers to as "soft" judgment proofing: merely limiting as opposed to completely
denying liability. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J.
1413, 1421 (1998) [hereinafter Virtual Judgment Proofing]. Thus, a strategy that denies a creditor
recovery of a portion of its claim would be deemed to be judgment proofing.
3. See Death of Liability, supra note 1, at 47 (arguing that computerized record keeping now
makes it feasible to maintain complex corporate judgment proof structures).
4. [d. at5.
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do the same. The social norms that prohibit their use among reputable businesses have begun to erode [and] the process may well be irreversible."5
This article attempts to refute these assertions. First, I demonstrate that
none of the examples put forth in the scholarship stands for the proposition
claimed-that innovative business transactions give rise to judgment proofing. Then I show that by focusing on the structuring of business transactions,
the scholarship obscures the conceptual divide between arm's length business transactions intended for judgment proofing, and non-arm's length
judgment proofing structures.6 Yet the different motivations, perspectives,
and costs inherent in each have crucial ramifications for the analysis.
In an arm's length judgment proofing transaction, each company will
seek independent gain. Therefore the structuring of an arm's length business
transaction, no matter how innovative, is unlikely to result in judgment
proofing because no company will give up value without demanding
equivalent value in return. It is, nonetheless, theoretically possible that unrelated companies could enter into arm's length judgment proofing transactions to take value from future involuntary creditors. I argue, however, that
those transactions are unlikely to occur because, from the perspective of the
company needed to assist the judgment proofing, potential costs may well
exceed the company's benefits.
In a non-arm's length structure, on the other hand, the judgment proofing
transaction takes place between related parties. Judgment proofing then is
more likely than in an arm's length transaction because its benefits need only
exceed its costs from the perspective of the controlling company. Non-arm's
length judgment proofing structures, however, are not innovative and have
long been regulated by law, which imposes costs that appear to outweigh any
potential benefits.
The importance of distinguishing between arm's length and non-arm's
length judgment proofing is not limited, however, to the different economic
treatment of those transactions. 7 Social psychology accentuates the distinc5. Id.
6. By ann's length, I mean transactions between two or more companies in which each company is attempting to maximize the value it will receive from the transaction. Transactions between
unrelated companies therefore would be expected to be ann's length. Cj DICTIONARY OF FINANCE
AND INVESTMENT TERMS 19 (2d ed. 1987) (defining "ann's length transaction" as one "that is
conducted as though the parties were unrelated, thus avoiding any semblance of conflict of interest"). By non-ann's length, I mean transactions in which one or more of the companies is not
seeking to maximize the value it will receive from the transaction. Relationships between related
companies mayor may not be arm's length. See notes 145-146 infra and accompanying text (discussing that whereas unrelated companies try to maximize the value each will receive from a transaction, related companies may want to maximize their aggregate corporate wealth, thereby making
judgment proofing easier).
7. That distinction would be interesting but not necessarily compelling since, in each case, the
economic result would be the same: The costs of judgment proofing appear to exceed the value
taken from involuntary creditors.
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tion. Professors Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler recently noted that "[t]raditional
law and economics is largely based on the standard assumptions of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are sometimes useful but often false.
People display bounded rationality ...."8 By applying bounded rationality
to the economics of judgment proofing,9 I find that, in an arm's length transaction, the costs of judgment proofing are magnified because the parties will
be risk averse. In a non-arm's length judgment proofing, however, those
costs are minimized because the parties are more likely to take risks. Therefore theory alone cannot be used to predict the spread of non-arm's length
judgment proofing transactions. Empirical data confirm, however, that nonarm's length judgment proofing is unlikely to increase in the future.
I conclude that existing constraints on judgment proofing are already
adequate, and the law is likely to evolve additional restrictions as necessary.
Accordingly, there is no need to impose regulatory responses. Indeed, to do
so could indiscriminately restrict the value creation that comes with business
and financial innovation.
To provide a context for my analysis, I begin by reviewing the current
scholarly debate.
I. THE DEBATE

The debate presently centers on the work of two prominent scholars,
Lynn LoPucki, the A. Robert Noll Professor at Cornell Law School, and
James J. White, the Robert A. Sullivan Professor at the University ofMichigan Law School. The former argues that liability is dying, while the latter
counters that assertion. My analysis parallels the work of these scholars in
two ways: It focuses on business judgment proofing strategies lO and meas-

8. Christine JolIs, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1545 (1998) (arguing for tempering the simple maximizing
model of economics with a psychological treatment). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Dlusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997) (nsing organizational psychology to
explain why corporations irrationalIy conceal information from the market); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Introduction: Is Law an Autonomous Discipline?, 21 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 85 (1997) (arguing
for the application of social psychology to law and economics).
9. An approach that generalIy can be referred to as behavioral economics. See JolIs et al.,
supra note 8, at 1474 ("behavioral economics alIows [one] to model and predict behavior relevant
to law with the tools of traditional economic analysis, but ,vith more accurate assumptions about
human behavior....").
1O. See generally Death ofLiability, supra note 1 (discussing strategies for business judgment
proofing); James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The
Death of Liability, 107 YALE L.J. 1363 (1998) (concluding that "Professor LoPucki is concerned
principalIy, if not exclusively, with the tort and statutory liability of public commercial firms" and
that "LoPucki should be concerned principalIy with injuries caused by business enterprises, not
with torts by individuals. It is a rare individual [subject to the special cases of personal automobile
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ures the impact of these strategies by their effect on future involuntary
creditors such as tort creditors and holders of statutorily imposed claims who
cannot protect themselves!! (as opposed to contract creditors who voluntarily
extend credit and therefore can protect themselves by demanding financial
information about the company and, if necessary, requiring guaranties or
collateral!2).

A LoPucki
Professor LoPucki contends that two basic types of judgment-proofing
strategies are relevant to business debtors: secured debt strategies, in which
unsecured claims of involuntary creditors are subordinated to secured
claims;!3 and third-party ownership strategies, in which ownership of valuable assets is transferred to third parties.I 4 Secured debt strategies are "so
deep-rooted in culture that they are virtually impossible to change."!5 Thirdparty ownership, however, represents a potentially damaging form of judgment proofing that could be susceptible to regulation.
liability and physician liability] who can cause enough personal injury or property damage to make
it worth his while to escape liability.").
11. See Death a/Liability, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that only tort and statutorily imposed liability are impacted); White, supra note 10, at 1365 (noting that the victims are not those with contract claims).
12. See White, supra note 10, at 1365 (noting that "Professor LoPucki recognizes that contract creditors-creditors ranging from banks to finance companies to suppliers-can and will bargain for protection").
13. See Death a/Liability, supra note 1, at 14-19. LoPucki asserts that secured debt strategies
are "employed primarily by small, relatively uncreditworthy businesses, whose lenders insist on
security interests.... The debtor becomes judgment proof by incurring secured debts in amounts
exceeding the liquidation values of the debtor's properties. Money judgments thereafter enforced
against the debtor's properties are subordinate to the secured debt." [d. at 14 (footnote omitted). A
problem with this assertion is that it fails to take into account that the debtor receives new money
for the loan, and that new money (unless wasted or misused by the debtor) creates value that will be
available to pay unsecured creditors. Cf notes 64-77 infra and accompanying text (discussing other
analyses that fail to account for the new money).
14. See Death 0/ Liability, supra note 1, at 19-30. He also contends that, in a non-business
context, two additional types of judgment proofing strategies are possible: exemption and foreign
haven. See id. at 30-38. The exemption strategy depends on state and federal laws that "exempt
various kinds of property from procedures to enforce judgments for money damages." [d. at 30-31.
The foreign haven strategy focuses on an individual debtor's transfer of her personal assets to a
foreign jurisdiction. See id. at 32. Creditors therefore must sue in the foreign jurisdiction and, if
that jurisdiction \vill not enforce liability against the debtor's assets, the transfer bars recovery. See
id. White agrees that LoPucki's categories of "exemption strategies and foreign haven strategies ... are not relevant to corporate liability." White, supra note 10, at 1368.
15. Death 0/ Liability, supra note 1, at 4. LoPucki indeed admits that a range of legal constructs, including not only secured debt but also shareholder limited liability, national sovereignty,
and the ownership of property, are equally deep rooted in culture and therefore virtually impossible
to change. See id. Cf Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority 0/ Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997) [hereinafter Easy Case] (arguing that contrary to the goal of
judgment proofing, secured credit actually increases the expected value of unsecured claims).
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He argues that there are two approaches to third-party ownership. In the
first, the parent-subsidiary strategy, "the debtor isolates the most valuable
assets of the business in an entity other than the one that conducts the liability-producing business activity."16 LoPucki describes a typical parentsubsidiary structure as follows:
[T]he company [Operations, Inc.] incorporates a subsidiary (Finance, Inc.), and
retains ownership of all the stock. As Operations sells its products, it creates
accounts receivable. Operations sells the accounts to Finance, and distributes
any proceeds beyond its immediate cash needs to its shareholders [leaving Operations with minimal assets]. Finance pays for the accounts by borrowing on
an unsecured basis from a bank. If Operations sells defective products and incurs liability, [the tort creditors' claims are subordinate to the bank's claim because the] bank claims the assets of Finance as an unsecured creditor while the
[tort] creditors claim them as a shareholder."17

This "parent-subsidiary ownership strategy," he alleges, "is in ,vide use
among the largest companies in America [and l]imiting liability ... is the
principal reason for" employing that strategy.IS
The other approach to third-party ownership, LoPucki contends, is asset
securitization, ''by far the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. credit
markets."19 In a securitization, a company transfers rights in incomeproducing assets20-such as accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals-to a
special purpose vehicle, or "SPV." The SPY, in tum, issues securities to
capital market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for the
assets)1 The investors, who are repaid from collections of the assets, buy the
securities based on their assessments of the value of the assets. Because the
SPY (and no longer the company) owns the assets, their investment decisions
often can be made without concern for the company's financial condition.
Thus, viable companies that otherwise cannot obtain financing, because of a
weakened financial condition, now can do so. Even companies that other16. Death ofLiability, supra note 1, at 20.
17. [d. Technically, of course, the tort creditors claim such assets not as shareholders but as
creditors of the shareholder.
18. [d. at 21. But see notes 66-71 infra and accompanying text (arguing that although the parent-subsidiary ownership strategy is widespread, limiting liability is not the principal reason for
using it).
19. Death ofLiability, supra note 1, at 24.
20. Income-producing assets are sometimes referred to as financial assets.
21. See generally TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1999); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter SECURITIZATION]; Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TuL. L. REv. 101 (1997) (examining why asset securitization has become a popular
financial device); Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1061 (1996) (explaining the source of securitization's benefits); Steven L. Schwarcz, The
Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133 (1994) (explaining the benefits of
asset securitization) [hereinafter Alchemy].
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wise could obtain financing now will be able to receive lower-cost capital
market financing.2 2
Whereas the parent-subsidiary structure is time honored, asset securitization is a relatively new phenomenon that has become widespread with the
help of computers.23 LoPucki sees it as a fundamental shift in the way that
companies deal with liability-a shift that has "enormous potential" for
judgment proofing:
By selling any asset to a ban1cruptcy-remote entity and leasing it back, the
debtor can transform it into an "income-producing" asset that can then be securitized....
Through asset securitization, a company potentially could divest itself of
all of its assets, yet continue to use all of those assets in the continued operation
of its business. To grasp the enormous potential, assume that, through a series
of asset securitizations, Exxon Corporation disposes of all of its assets. As the
cash from these transactions becomes available, Exxon distributes the cash to
its shareholders in the form of dividends, leaving the company ,vith neither assets nor liabilities. (I ,vill refer to this judgment-proof Exxon as "Zero-Asset
Exxon.") Because Exxon contracts to continue use of each asset even as Exxon
sells it, the operations of Zero-Asset Exxon remain exactly as they were when it
was a multibillion dollar company. But as a result of the asset-securitization
transactions and the distribution of the proceeds, Zero-Asset Exxon is now
judgment proof.24

Accordingly, LoPucki warns, "[a]sset securitization may be the silver bullet
capable of killing liability."25
LoPucki next argues that existing constraints on judgment proofing,26 as

22. Securitization has an increasingly international focus, in part because companies that wish
to raise funds from the capital markets may not be located in countries with established capital
markets. To access capital market funding, those companies will have to structure deals that cross
their national borders. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Language 0/ Cross-Border Finance,
8 DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 235,236-37 (1998). To the extent securitization creates a problem of
judgment proofing, the judgment proofing problem would be international and not merely domestic.
23. Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colleta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues
and New Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1369, 1370-71 (1991) (describing computers and other new
technology as contributing factors to the explosive growth of securitization).
24. Death 0/Liability, supra note 1, at 25-26 (footnotes omitted). LoPucki sees all assets as
transformable into income-producing assets that can be securitized. I later show, however, that
there are significant practical limitations on the transformation of assets into income-producing
assets and that, even given such transformation, asset securitization will not judgment-proof a company because the company receives cash proceeds equal to the amount of any assets transferred. I
also show that the initial sale-leaseback transaction, and not a subsequent securitization, is the more
relevant transaction for investigating judgment proofing, and that even a sale-leaseback transaction
is not troublesome so long as the company, in this case Exxon, retains the sale proceeds.
25. Death o/Liability, supra note I, at 30.
26. He identifies five existing constraints. The first, which he calls self-immolation, is that
shareholders of a company would oppose judgment proofing because the company's inability to pay
claims would wipe out equity. Nonetheless, he argues that by externalizing liability and thereby
enabling the company to borrow at a lower interest rate, judgment proofing increases, rather than
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well as radical reform responses, would be inadequate.27 He therefore concludes that innovative third-party ownership structures, such as asset securitization and parent-subsidiary ownership, will kill business liability.28

lowers, the ex ante value of equity. See Death ofLiability, supra note 1, at 40-42. Another constraint is the precarious position at judgment proof firms of managers who, if the firm incurs a significant liability, may lose their jobs. See id. at 42-43. He nevertheless contends that firms can
overcome this constraint by paying managers a portion of the benefits of externalizing. See id. at
43. (I later discuss this constraint in the context of analyzing the agency costs of judgment proofing. See notes 109, 115-116 infra and accompanying text.) A third constraint is that few companies would find judgment proofing to be cost effective because the cost of jUdgment-proofing a
business is high whereas the risk of significant liability is low. See Death ofLiability, supra note 1,
at 43-47. However, he counters that the cost of judgment proofing will decline "once other large
companies break the ice," and then even large, established companies will consider judgment
proofing strategies worth the expense and hassle. Id. at 44 (analogizing the situation to the reluctance oflarge companies to use bankruptcy reorganization in the 1970s, whereas now bankruptcy is
an acceptable corporate tool). A fourth possible constraint is the legal and clerical costs of maintaining complex corporate judgment proof structures, but LoPucki counters that computerized record keeping now makes this feasible. See id. at 47-51. As for the final constraint, culture and politics, he concludes that "all hell would [not] break loose" if large companies were to make themselves judgment proof because, at least in the small business context, "[t]he company went bankrupt" is considered an adequate explanation for why tort claimants and other unsecured creditors
often are not paid. See id. at 51-54. "[S]o long as the companies march into this new world [of
judgment proofing] in tandem, each objecting that it is forced into its course of action by competitive pressures, it will be difficult for indignation to take hold." Id. at 54 (footnote omitted). (I later
argue, however, that judgment proofing creates additional reputational costs. See notes 109-114
infra and accompanying text.)
27. Several radical reform responses have been advanced. One response is to extend liability
from property of the debtor to the debtor's shareholders, affiliates, and trading partners (and possibly even to those who provide the assets used in the debtor's business), thereby motivating those
parties to contract among themselves to assure that the liability is paid, such as by compelling the
corporation to purchase adequate liability insurance. See Death of Liability, supra note 1, at 55
(referring to the scholarly debate over whether shareholders should have liability for torts committed by their corporations if the corporation's assets are insufficient to satisfY its liabilities). Nonetheless, those parties would have little difficulty defeating unlimited liability. For example, it is
impractical for tort claimants to identifY shareholders who might be worth suing, and the lawsuit
itself might not be cost effective, especially where the claim is small. See id. at 56-57 (noting that
share ownership often is beneficially owned for individual investors who hold minute fractional
interests). Investors also could shift to trust structures in which they would retain limited liability,
see id. at 58-59, or they could purchase shares in u.S. corporations through foreign limited liability
companies and thereby rely on foreign law to defeat liability. See id. at 59-61 (citing arguments
advanced by Professor Joseph Grundfest). LoPucki additionally suggests, as a radical reform response, that subordinating secured creditor claims to involuntary claims would encourage secured
creditors to monitor their debtors in order to limit their liability-generating activity. See id. at 61.
However, debtors then could use securitization to avoid becoming subject to monitoring because, he
maintains, investors in the securitization transaction would be owners, not secured creditors, and
therefore their claims would not be subject to subordination. See id. at 62 (noting that small businesses sometimes do this). Even conditioning the right to do business on demonstrating financial
responsibility-such as by requiring minimum levels of liability insurance, surety bonds, or proof
of solvency-would not prevent judgment proofing because many liability-generating occurrences,
such as intentional torts, are not of an insurable nature. Making them insurable would create a
moral hazard because the tortfeasor would no longer bear, and therefore would not be deterred by,
the cost of its actions. See id. at 72. Moreover, experience in those parts of the economy where
insurance is compulsory today shows "a sharp increase in the burden of regulation and a diminution
of the effectiveness ofliability insurance." Id. at 80.
28. See id. at 90.
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LoPucki more recently has observed that:
all, or substantially all, judgment proofing has a single essential structure: a
symbiotic relationship between two or more entities, in which one of the entities
generates disproportionately high risks of liability and another owns a disproportionately high level of assets. Through the contract that unites them, the two
entities allocate between them the gains from judgment proofing.29

This is not only a more generic way of describing the "third-party ownership" judgment proofing structures (asset securitization, sale-leaseback, and
parent-subsidiary ownership) referred to in The Death of Liability30 but also
describes such traditional fonns of judgment proofing as leasing assets to an
undercapitalized company.3 1 Because the "third-party ownership" structures32 describe representative judgment proofing transactions, I will refer to
them as well as to the generic structure.
In these articles, LoPucki rarely distinguishes whether he is focusing on
arm's length or non-arm's length transactions. His analysis, however, is
broad enough to include both-his generic structure includes the example of
a "symbiotic relationship that exists between truly independent owning and
operating entities"33-and his intention clearly was to focus on both.3 4 My

29. Essential Structure, supra note 2, at 149.
30. To understand why, recall that the third-party ownership strategy is comprised of two basic techniques-parent-subsidiary ownership and asset securitization-and that asset securitization
is preceded by a sale-leaseback transaction in which ordinary assets are converted to incomeproducing assets. In the parent-subsidiary ownership technique, the parent-operating company
incorporates a finance subsidiary which borrows money to purchase accounts receivable from the
parent The parent, in tum, pays the money to its shareholders in the form of dividends. Thus, the
parent, which continues to operate its business, generates disproportionately high risks of liability
based on its minimal net worth, while the finance subsidiary owns a disproportionately high level of
assets (all of the accounts receivable). In the asset securitization (and sale-leaseback) technique, the
operating company sells its assets to a separate entity, which leases those assets back. The operating company then pays the sale proceeds to its shareholders in the form of a dividend and continues
to operate \vith the leased assets. Thus, the operating company generates disproportionately high
risks of liability based on its failure to own assets, while the separate entity owns a disproportionately high level of assets (all of the assets).
31. Because this article focuses on whether innovative business transactions are causing
judgment proofing, the issue of whether state corporation law imposes adequate capital requirements is beyond its scope. Nonetheless, I examine undercapitalization as one of a range of judgment proofing te,chniques.
32. That is, those structures described as such in Death ofLiability, supra note 1. As LoPucki
defines his "essential structure," however, it is merely another name for generic third-party ownership. For example, even leasing assets to an undercapitalized company could be referred to as thirdparty ownership by the lessor.
33. Essential Structure, supra note 2, at 155. He also uses an example of "cooperating entities [that] form independently of each other [and are] brought together by investment bankers or
brokers to contract at arm's length." Id. at 156.
34. See Letter from Lynn M. LoPucki, A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School,
to Steven L. Schwarcz, Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law 2 (October 17, 1998) (on
file with author) (confirming that intention).
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analysis also will cover both ann's length and non-ann's length judgment
proofing.

B. White
In an empirical response, Professor White presents an empirical analysis
intended to show that "the story Professor LoPucki tells is fictional."35 Observing that the amount of secured debt as a percentage of a company's assets has not been increasing,36 White suggests that creditors are insufficiently
concerned about judgment proofing to demand additional collateral. He also
finds "there is no perceivable long-term trend [in the ratio of corporate assets
to liabilities]. The medians for all data are remarkably constant, hovering
near [an asset-to-liability ratio of] 1.75."37 Thus, he believes, companies
remain adequately capitalized.3 8 White additionally finds that, although
"[b]uying liability insurance is inconsistent with judgment proofing,"39 the
"data show no significant changes between 1981 and 1995" in the amount of
liability insurance carried by companies.40 Based on these findings, White
concludes that "firms choose not to judgment proof themselves" and that
''judgment proofmg ... is unlikely ever to grow into a serious problem in the
United States."41 In short, "[l]iability lives."42
Incongruously, White then cautions that it is presently impossible to
prove or disprove whether judgment proofing will kill liability.43 White
states that he has "uncovered no empirical evidence for the proposition that
American firms, in general, have judgment proofed themselves or are judg-

35. White, supra note 10, at 1364.
36. His data indeed show that "[tJhe number of companies with significant secured debt is declining, not rising." Id. at 1374.
37. Id. at 1376. But see note 261 infra (arguing that there are several ways that the asset-toliability ratio could be manipulated by a company).
38. See White, supra note 10, at 1375.
39. Id. at 1380. White argues that if ''businesses believe that they can render themselves
judgment proof, it is a waste of money to purchase liability insurance." Id. at 1381. But see note
261 infra (arguing that even judgment proof companies will buy liability insurance so long as its
cost is less than the cost of bankruptcy). .
40. White, supra note 10, at 1380.
41. Id. at 1364. White collected his data from all of the companies in Standard & Poor's
Compustat database, a compilation of public financial data for publicly traded companies. See id. at
1370 & n.38. Even though his data are limited to public companies, White ''believers] that data
from private companies would be no different [because aJlmost all of the barriers in [his article] to
judgment proofing apply equally to public and private firms." Id. at 1412.
42. Id. at 1412.
43. That claim is "as impossible to disprove as it is impossible to prove, for it involves not
only an assumption of universal judgment proofing, but also an assumption that Chapter 11 will
become cheaper and more efficient than it is now." Id. at 1383. Nonetheless, White argues that "it
is as easy to imagine a world in which firms are judgment proof and Chapter 11 is more expensive
and more stigmatizing than insurance." Id.
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ment proofing themselves," but nevertheless concludes that "the data do not
foreclose the possibility that Professor LoPucki's claims will turn out to be
correct in the future."44
After setting forth his empirical arguments,4S White considers potential
barriers to judgment proofing.46 His principal argument derives from the
classic Modigliani-Miller thesis of finance theory: that the market value of
any firm is independent of its capital structure.47 Thus, the only way that
equity holders can use judgment proofing to enhance their value is by taking
value from creditors.48 That would be possible only if the creditors either are
foolish, which he assumes they are not, or involuntary creditors who cannot
bargain.49 I agree with this view, and therefore focus on how judgment
proofing can be used to take value from involuntary creditors.

44. Id. at 1394. I later show, however, that Professor White's empirical data are valuable in
analyzing non-arm's lengthjudgment proofing. See notes 261-269 infra and accompanying text
45. White uses a quasi-empirical argument to respond to the assertion that companies use a
parent-subsidiary strategy for judgment proofing. The Compustat data show only consolidated
financial information-that is, information on a parent and its subsidiaries is reported as if all such
companies were a single entity-and therefore cannot shed light on the separate financial status of
subsidiaries. Nonetheless, White's review of 22 randomly selected companies that engage in risky
activity shows no significant trend toward increasing the number of subsidiaries. See White, supra
note 10, at 1388. At the same time, there are perfectly legitimate reasons, such as tax and foreign
licensing requirements, for conducting business through subsidiaries. Even if a large corporation
conducts a portion of its business in a foreign jurisdiction and does not ,vish to expose all of its
assets to liability in that jurisdiction, that is different from judgment proofing so long as the subsidiary is adequately capitalized. See id. at 1390. White also provides examples where prominent
companies paid their subsidiaries' liabilities. See id. at 1391-93 (discussing Union Carbide's response to the Bhopal disaster, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and Dow Coming's breast implant litigation).
46. For example, White argues that the only companies that should raise concerns over judgment proofing are those that might ''perpetrate mass torts and be subject to large statutory liability."
White, supra note 10, at 1396. However, "[t]o commit large torts, one must do large business, and
to do large business normally requires substantial assets." Id. This argument may be flawed, however, because a company with leased assets can commit the same torts, and thereby become subject
to the same liability, as one that owns the assets. See also id. at 1399-1412 (advancing other arguments as to why businesses would be expected to maintain substantial assets or insurance in lieu of
assets).
47. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory ofInvestment, AM. EeON. REv., June 1958, at 261, 268.
48. See White, supra note 10, at 1394 (noting that this must be done while creditors are not
paying attention).
49. See id. White argues, nonetheless, that involuntary creditors may be indirectly protected
by contractual creditors who "appreciate the risk ... when firms make themselves judgment proof
and ... demand corresponding compensation." ld. at 1396. However, a company could compensate voluntary creditors ,vithout compensating involuntary creditors. Providing compensation only
to contractual creditors also would undercut White's subsequent argument that "conditions that the
prospective contract creditors wiII demand before lending to a judgment proof company may prove
to be so costly that the debtor ,viII choose to capitalize the company more fully to avoid those [conditions]." ld. at 1397. White indeed acknowledges that "the interests of the contract creditors and
the [involuntary] creditors are not exactly aligned. Indeed, the contract creditors might take security
and thus protect themselves to the detriment oflater [involuntary] claimants." ld. at 1398. But he
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I next show that judgment proofing is unlikely to become endemic, as
predicted by LoPucki; but the reasons it will not spread are different than
those advanced by White.
II. ANALYSIS

LoPucki's central assertion is that the advent of securitization and other
innovative business transactions is causing the death of liability. However,
by focusing on the structuring of business transactions,50 he ignores the important differences between arm's length and non-arm's length transactions. 51 Different motivations, perspectives, and costs are inherent in each.
In an arm's length judgment proofing transaction, each company will seek
independent gain, whereas in a non-arm's length structure, judgment proofing only needs to benefit the controlling company. My analysis therefore
addresses arm's length and non-arm's length transactions separately.
A

The Structuring ofArm's Length Business Transactions Should Not Give
Rise to Judgment Proofing

I first test this proposition in the context of each of the potentially arm's
length structures referenced by LoPucki, including sale-leaseback, securitization, and his "essential structure."52 I then examine the proposition in light
of the possibility that arm's length parties could attempt to take advantage of
the value that judgment proofing would wrest from future involuntary creditors.
To provide a context for the analysis, consider companies Fl and F2,
which are unrelated. F 1 is about to sell its assets to F2 and lease them
argues that we do not observe this because the contractual "creditor may fear that the assets [taken
as securityJ-even with a value equal to the amount of the debt while the concern is operatingwill be inadequate to satisfY their claims on default." ld. White illustrates his argument by an
example in which inventory purchased for $100 million may tum out to be worth only $10 or $20
million on the default of the business if the inventory has to be scrapped or sold at low prices to
others. See id. at 1399. That argument, however, fails to recognize the customary secured lending
practice of providing collateral with a value sufficiently in excess of the claim and not, as White
suggests, merely equal to the claim. This practice helps to ensure payment in full even if the firm
stops operating.
50. Professor White also appears to focns solely on transaction structure. For example, he
notes early in his article that "distributing one's assets to shareholders in preference to creditors
[has] been practiced for hundreds of years; [it is] explicitly not the subject of Professor LoPucki's
complaint." White, supra note 10, at 1364. Nonetheless, White later acknowledges that "to judgment proof [a debtor] requires a second step, namely the disposition of the net proceeds [of the
judgment proofing transfer] by dividends to shareholders." ld. at 1375 n.49.
51. See note 34 supra and accompanying text (observing that although LoPucki rarely distinguishes whether he is focusing on arm's length or non-arm's length transactions, his analysis is
intended to include both).
52. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
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back-a sale-leaseback being the threshold transaction in which Fl converts
its ordinary assets into securitizable income-producing assets (in the form of
leases)53 while still being able to use the original assets. Fl, however, would
have an immediate and significant disincentive against engaging in this
threshold transaction: It would be taxed on the sale income.54
If Fl nonetheless engages in the sale-leaseback, the lease theoretically
can be securitized.55 Securitization has been alleged to be the most dangerous threat to liability.56 But a close analysis shows that allegation to be unfounded. Formalistically, only the buyer of the original assets, F2, can lease
those assets back to Fl, and therefore only F2 will hold leases which can be
securitized.57 Thus, F 1, the very company that is in danger of becoming
judgment-proofed by securitization, would not technically be a party to the
securitization transaction.58 More substantively, securitization is merely a
way of allowing F2 to finance the purchase of F l' s assets, with F 1 receiving
the sale proceeds. Judgment proofing only could result from Fl's disposition of those sale proceeds for less than their value. That disposition, if it
occurred, would be independent of the securitization transaction.
Even an argument that securitization indirectly facilitates judgment
proofing by enabling F2 to finance the purchase of Fl's assets would fail
because F2 could finance the purchase of those assets through traditional
53. To the extent FI already owns income-producing assets, it could securitize those assets
without engaging in a sale-leaseback. However, income-producing assets are only a fraction of the
value of a typical company's assets. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. DIAMOND, ERIC G. FLAMHOLTZ &
DIANA TROICK FLAMHOLTZ, FiNANCIAL ACCOUNTING 762 (2d ed. 1990) (citing the 1988 balance
sheet of Toys 'R Us, Inc., in which the ratio ofincome-producing assets to total assets was 5.3%, as
an illustrative financial statement); CHARLES T. HORNGREN, GARY L. SUNDEM & JOHN A. ELLIOT,
INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 763 (5th ed. 1993) (using the 1991 balance sheet of
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in which the ratio of income-producing assets to total assets was 7.5%, as a
model throughout the book). Moreover, I later show that only F2, not FI, could securitize the income-producing lease assets created by the sale-leaseback. See notes 57-58 infra and accompanying
text
54. FI's gain will be taxed as either capital gain or ordinary income, or a combination, depending on the nature of the assets sold. For corporate sellers, however, the rate on both types of
gain is 35%, although the characterization as gain or ordinary income will govern FI's ability to
offset the gain with capital, versus ordinary, losses. See I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1231, 1245, 1250 (1986 &
Supp.1999). Thus, if FJ sells $10 million of assets to F2, and FI's gain on sale is high because the
assets had appreciated while being held by FI or constitute depreciable property with respect to
which depreciation deductions have been taken, FI may have to pay up to $3.5 million in federal
taxes. FI's gain also may be subject to taxation under state law.
55. Although I follow LoPucki in focusing on the sale-leaseback model, my analysis applies
to any other model, such as a sale and license-back, that transfers ownership of FI's assets to F2
while allowing FI to continue to use those assets.
56. Recall that securitization has been called the "silver bullet capable of killing liability."
Death ofLiability, supra note 1, at 30.
57. F2 could be either an Spy or an operating company; the only requirement in this discussion of arm's length judgment proofing is that it is unrelated to Fl.
58. F2 would be the originator of the income-producing assets as well as the issuer of securities to capital market investors; FI merely would be the obligor on those assets.
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techniques, such as bank borrowing.59 The possibility that securitization or
other financing techniques might be misused should not undermine their
overalllegitimacy.6o In any event, the likelihood that F2 would be able to
obtain securitization or other financing on the strength of a lease to Fl is extremely remote. Few investors or bank lenders would be willing to take the
risk that future rentals of a judgment prooflessee would be paid.61
The alanning description of Exxon's ability to judgment proof itself
through securitization vividly demonstrates my point. Recall the claim that
[b]y seIling any asset to a bankruptcy-remote entity and leasing it back, the
debtor can transform it into an "income-producing" asset that can then be securitized.
. . . To grasp the enormous potential, assume that, through a series of asset
securitizations, Exxon Corporation disposes of all of its assets.... Because
Exxon contracts to continue use of each asset even as Exxon sells it, the operations of Zero-Asset Exxon remain exactly as they were when it was a
multibiIIion doIIar company.62

Exxon first sells its assets to the bankruptcy-remote entity and receives a
cash purchase price,63 and the entity then leases those assets back to Exxon,
with the lease becoming the income-producing asset. But the bankruptcyremote entity alone owns that income-producing asset. Exxon merely is a
lessee. Therefore, on a fonnalistic level, only the entity, and not Exxon,
could sell that asset in a securitization transaction.
More substantively, Exxon's creditors would not have to worry about a
securitization transaction. In the unlikely event that the bankruptcy-remote

59. For example, F2 could borrow money secured by a pledge of the lease and its underlying
assets. FI also could judgment-proof itself absent a sale-leaseback by transferring its assets as
dividends to its shareholders. A company may dividend any assets, whether or not in the form of
cash, to its shareholders. JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HAzEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS § 20.1, at 20.3 (1995). However, FI would not be able to continue to use the assets absent
a sale-leaseback.
60. Securitization has valid business reasons, such as reducing the cost of capital. Reducing
the cost of capital '''results in enhanced output, and consumers as a whole are better off.'" Peter
Coy, Doing Business, Bus. WK., Aug. 31, 1998, at 98 (quoting Nobel Prize ,vinner Myron S.
Scholes).
61. See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text (explaining why investors ,vill not want to
take the risk of a judgment proof lessee). Investors almost certainly will become aware of the risk
because if F2 fails to disclose Fl's intention to judgment-proof itself, F2 may be liable for securities fraud. Also, while it is not inconceivable that a judgment proof FI sometimes may hope to
generate sufficient business profits from its use of the leased assets to be able to pay its future lease
rental obligations, FI still may be forced into bankruptcy during the lease term if significant other
liabilities arise, such as tort judgments. Ironically, then, there is an inverse-not a direct-relationship between securitization and judgment proofing of Fl. The stronger Fl's financial health, the
more likely a securitization would succeed; the weaker its financial health (a judgment proof FI
being very weak), the less likely a securitization would succeed.
62. Death a/Liability, supra note 1, at 25-26 (footnotes omitted).
63. Exxon therefore now owns the cash instead of hard assets.
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entity is able to fmance the purchase of Exxon's assets,64 the funds raised
would be paid to Exxon as the purchase price. Hence, Exxon's hard assets
are merely replaced by cash.6s Because Exxon's creditors are only interested
in repayment of their claims, they should be satisfied with the cash. Only a
subsequent disposition of that cash, unrelated to the securitization, would
cause judgment proofing. Securitization itself is not a judgment proofing
technique.
Next consider the parent-subsidiary ownership strategy. (This strategy is
not technically arm's length;66 however, I include it in this discussion because it is one of the transactional structures referenced by LoPucki.) Although the strategy "is in wide use among the largest companies in America,"67 there is no evidence that it causes judgment proofing. However, there
is significant evidence that parent-subsidiary ownership allows a manufacturing company to obtain lower-cost financing, thereby arguably benefitting
its involuntary creditors by lowering the company's overall debt burden.68
64. Potential investors would question whether Zero-Asset Exxon would pay its rentals. See
notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text (explaining the improbability that F2 would be able to
obtain financing on the strength of a lease to a judgment prooflessee).
65. However, if the bankruptcy-remote entity is unrelated to Exxon, the sale-leaseback would
reduce Ex.xon's value due to taxes. See note 54 supra and accompanying text (discussing tax treatment of an arm's length sale-leaseback transaction). But if the bankruptcy-remote entity is related
to Ex.xon and part of its consolidated tax group, Exxon may be able to defer paying taxes on the
sale. See note 145 infra and accompanying text (discussing tax treatment of a non-arm's length
sale-leaseback transaction).
66. See notes 139-142 infra and accompanying text (analyzing a generic parent-subsidiary
ownership strategy as an example of a non-arm's length judgment proofing transaction).
67. Death of Liability, supra note 1, at 21. Indeed, this strategy has long been used by such
prominent companies as Ford (and its finance subsidiary, Ford Credit Corporation), Chrysler (and
its finance subsidiary, Chrysler Credit Corporation), General Motors (and its finance subsidiary,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC», BMW (and its finance subsidiary, BMW Finance Company), and Allis Chalmers (and its finance subsidiary, Allis Chalmers Credit Corporation).
68. The parent-subsidiary strategy permits the manufacturing company to obtain lower-cost
financing in the following, indirect, manner: Its subsidiary, not burdened with the business risks of
an operating company, is able to obtain low-cost institutional or capital market financing. See, e.g.,
John F. Connolly, Finance Subsidiaries: Establishment, Utilization, and Constraints, 414 PLII
COMM 297,301 (1987) ("Securities issuances by a finance subsidiary generally receive higher ratings (frequently triple A) by the rating agencies, thereby enabling a finance subsidiary to issue securities at lower interest rates ... than a securities issuance by its parent association."). The subsidiary then uses the proceeds of that financing to stimulate sales of its parent's products by providing
consumers with low-cost credit For example, a consumer may chose to purchase a BMW automobile because BMW Finance Company, which can borrow more cheaply than could BMW, is able to
finance the consumer at a low interest rate. Professor White notes that the parent-subsidiary strategy also is useful for incorporating subsidiaries under foreign law for regulatory or tax reasons, to
limit exposure of a large company's U.S. assets in a foreign jurisdiction where the subsidiary is
already adequately capitalized, or for "managerial and organizational efficiencies in operating a
particular business as a separately incorporated subsidiary." White, supra note 10, at 1390-91.
Furthermore, some securitization transactions utilize a parent-subsidiary strategy as part of a "twotier structure." See Peter V. Pantaleo, Herbert S. Edelman, Frederick L. Feldkamp, Jason Kravitt,
Walter McNeill, Thomas E. Plank, Kenneth P. Morrison, Steven L. Schwarcz, Paul Shupack, and
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LoPucki apparently draws an incorrect conclusion from the parent-subsidiary
ownership strategy because he assumes, without basis, that Operations (the
parent) "distributes any proceeds beyond its immediate cash needs to its
shareholders."69 Not only does that assumption not reflect business reality,70
it illustrates the failure to distinguish between structuring an arm's length
transaction and the completely unrelated step of paying dividends.71
Finally, examine LoPucki's "essential structure" of judgment proofing.72
If a company wishes to judgment proof itself, it would have to transfer its
assets. 73 It is possible to divide potential recipients of the transfer into three
categories: the company's creditors, the company's owners (its shareholders), and third parties other than creditors and owners. A transfer of assets to
creditors would be the antithesis of judgment proofing. A transfer of assets
to shareholders could cause judgment proofmg, but the payment of such
dividends is not necessarily dependent on the essential structure. A transfer
of assets to unrelated third parties should not cause judgment proofmg because no rational company will give away its assets without demanding
equivalent value in return. Thus, in an arm's length context, none of these
transfers causes judgment proofmg.
The failure to recognize that structuring an arm's length transaction does
not cause judgment proofmg stems from a failure to trace cash flows. This is
exemplified by Professor LoPucki's use of the Rockefeller Center financing
to illustrate the use of judgment proofing techniques:
The land and buildings constituting Rockefeller Center were owned by two
partnerships, referred to collectively as Rockefeller Center Properties (RCP).

Barry Zaretsky, Rethinking the Role a/Recourse in the Sale 0/Financial Assets, 52 Bus. LAW. 159,
162 n.8 (1996) (describing the two-tier structure). Nevertheless, the parent benefits directly because
it receives the proceeds of the transaction.
69. Death a/Liability, supra note 1, at 20.
70. It simply is unrealistic to assume that the primary purpose of raising capital is to distribute
it to shareholders. Companies generally raise capital to continue or to expand their businesses. See,
e.g., note 68 supra (explaining how the parent-subsidiary strategy would help BMW sell its cars).
71. Without the dividend payment, the parent-subsidiary strategy would not, in and of itself,
cause judgment proofing because the parent retains the equity interest in the subsidiary and, in any
event, only needs to transfer to the finance subsidiary sufficient assets to support the financing. An
extraordinary transfer that renders the parent insolvent could be avoided as a fraudulent conveyance. See notes 162-175 infra and accompanying text (discussing the application of fraudulent
conveyance law to judgment proofing and showing that existing law restricts the use of non-arm's
length transactions, including the parent-subsidiary structure, for judgment proofing).
72. The "essential structure" comprises a "symbiotic relationship between two or more entities, in which one of the entities generates disproportionately high risks of liability and another
owns a disproportionately high level of assets." Essential Structure, supra note 2, at 149).
73. No transfer would be needed, however, where the liability-generating company is undercapitalized ab initio. The company then would need to lease its assets from third parties. But in an
arm's length context, rational lessors are unlikely (without additional protection, such as shareholder guaranties) to agree to lease assets to a judgment proof company. See note 61 supra and
accompanying text (explaining that a judgment prooflessee might not pay its future rentals).
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The partners were two private corporations ... that were in turn owned by unnamed members of the Rockefeller family and Mitsubishi Estate Company, Inc.
Rockefeller Center was appraised at $1.25 billion in 1994. The ownership
structure was hard judgment proofed by a mortgage in the amount of approximately $1.3 billion [on the Rockefeller Center land and buildings,] in favor of
Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. (RCP!), a public corporation that apparently
was created to and did deal at arm's length with RCP.74

However, the conclusion that the mortgage in favor of RePI "hard judgment
proofed" the transaction ignores that Rep receives the mortgage loan proceeds.75 After the mortgage loan was made, Rep had $1.3 billion of new
assets (in the form of proceeds) and $1.3 billion of new debt,76 preserving the
net worth that Rep enjoyed prior to the loan77-hardly judgment proofing!
Accordingly, none of the proffered examples stands for the proposition
claimed: that innovative business transactions give rise to judgment proofing. I next show that it is unlikely, even in theory, that arm's length business
transactions can be used for judgment proofing.
B. Arm's Length Business Transactions Are Unlikely to Take Advantage of
the Value That Judgment Proofing Would Wrest From Future Involuntary Creditors

There remains a conceptual risk of judgment proofing in arm's length
business transactions. A company, Fl, may wish to increase its shareholder
value by taking value from potential future involuntary creditors. Let Il
stand for the amount of value that judgment proofing is expected to take
from such creditors.78 F 1 could attempt to contract with one or more unrelated companies to share the value of Il if the unrelated companies-which I

74. [d. at 1423 (citing ROCKEFELLER CrR. PROPERTIES, INC., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR
ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1995, at 6 (1996) [hereinafter RCP! FORM 10-KD.

75. RCP owned Rockefeller Center free and clear before it took out the mortgage loan. See
RCP! FORM 10-K, supra note 74, at 3, 32, 76. From RCP's standpoint, the loan provided funds by
which to reorganize by paying outstanding creditor claims. [d. at 76. For RCP!, the loan was an
investment. It was convertible at RCPI's option into a 71.5% equity interest in Rockefeller Center.
[d. at 32. Furthennore, RCP's Chapter 11 plan provided that, upon confinnation, Rockefeller Center would be transferred to RCP! in satisfaction of the loan and mortgage. [d. at 62, 64.
76. See id. at5 (describing the amount of the mortgage loan as $1.3 billion).
77. The assertion that "[h]ad portions of Rockefeller Center toppled into the streets of New
York and caused billions of dollars in damages while this structure was in place, the judgment
creditors probably could not have reached either the value of Rockefeller Center or the wealth of the
Rockefeller family and the Mitsubishi Estate" is inaccurate. Virtual Judgment Proofing, supra note
2, at 1424. The creditors could have reached the same value of RCP's unencumbered assets, $1.25
billion, that would be available absent the mortgage loan. Admittedly, some portion of the equity
might be lost in foreclosure; but if that is the problem, the more appropriate solution is to refonn the
collateral foreclosure process.
78. In computing jj., FI's potential liability to future creditors therefore should be discounted
by the probability that liability will not arise.
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collectively refer to as F2-help Fl to become judgment proof. Let K stand
for the amount of compensation that F2 would require to participate in
judgment proofing. Ih: is less than 8, judgment proofing may occur.
Fl could attempt to judgment proof itself by bifurcating ownership and
use of its assets. If Fl has existing assets, it would try to sell those assets to,
and lease them back from, F2, and then dispose of the sale proceeds by paying dividends to its shareholders.79 If Fl is undercapitalized ab initio, it already would be judgment proof and therefore simply would try to lease its
operating assets from F2. In either case, F2 would demand compensation in
excess of ordinary market-rate lease rentals because Fl, being judgment
proof, may go bankrupt during the lease tenn, creating a risk that the rentals
will remain unpaid.
There are only three broad fonns of compensation that F 1 could offer
F2. One is lease rentals that exceed market-rate rentals; another is a share in
Fl's equity; the third is a lump-sum payment. Whichever fonn (or combination of fonns) is chosen, it would represent F l' s offer to share a portion of
8 with F2 in exchange for the judgment proofing. so I next show that the
likelihood that Fl and F2 will be able to agree on compensation is, at best,
remote because the value of judgment proofing to F 1 may well be less than
the costs it would impose on F2.
My analysis starts by showing that the only realistic fonn of compensation is a lump-sum payment. Consider the alternatives: If Fl offers abovemarket lease rentals, F2 would rationally agree to this deal only if it is comfortable that the present value of the rentals paid will at least equal K. But F2
will have difficulty reaching that conclusion. Fl's ability to pay rentals ,vill

79. Recall that the essential judgment proofing step is really the asset disposition for less than
equivalent value, in this case the dividend. I later show that such dispositions are restricted by
fraudulent conveyance law, see notes 162-175 infra and accompanying text, and, in the case of
dividends, also by corporation law, see notes 200-206 infra and accompanying text. LoPucki
nonetheless argues that if FI does not distribute the sale proceeds to its shareholders, it "will invest
them in the business, in which case the size of the business, and presumably its capacity to generate
liability, will be increased," an effect he calls "a kind of soft judgment proofing, because the company's ratio of assets to potential liabilities has been reduced." Virtual Judgment Proofing, supra
note 2, at 1430. His argument is not convincing, however, because so long as assets exceed potentialliabilities, creditors ,vill be paid in full; and freezing a company's level of risk would undermine
its ability to enter into new, and therefore potentially risky, ventures. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinking A Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647, 680-82 (1996)
(arguing that, absent covenants or insolvency, creditors have no right to preserve their debtor's
economic position). Furthermore, if FI wants to reduce its ratio of assets to liabilities, it more easily could do so by borrowing on a secured basis and using the loan proceeds to expand the business.
In that context, I have shown that rather than creating a soft judgment proofing that harms unsecured creditors, new money secured borrowing actually increases the expected value of their claims.
See Easy Case, supra note 15.
80. FI could not assign to F2 an actual share in tJ. because tJ. represents a cost saving, not a
revenue. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
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depend entirely on its success in generating profits with the leased assets,S! a
business risk that F2 may not wish to take.S2 Furthermore, because FI is
judgment proof, it might go bankrupt during the lease term,S3 creating legal
uncertainty whether F2 will be paid its rentals. s4 Although theoretically
some amount of rentals might be high enough to offset these risks, Fl would
not agree to pay rentals that are so high as to deprive it of A.SS Above-market
rentals are therefore a dubious incentive. S6
If FI offers a share in its equity, F2 again would rationally agree to this
deal only if F2 is comfortable that the present value of that equity interest
will at least equal K. But FI's lack of assets and its risk of bankruptcy mar81. F2 cannot even require F1 to collateralize its lease obligations because FI, being judgment proof, has no significant assets. However, where one or more of Fl's shareholders owns a
significant equity interest, such as in a closely held corporation, that shareholder might offer to
guaranty FI's lease obligations in exchange for the judgment proofing. Whether such a shareholder
wiII exist and, if so, whether F2 wiIl find its guaranty satisfactory as a credit matter are questions of
fact I later argue that shareholders may be reluctant to offer such guaranties because, by doing so,
they risk substantive consolidation if FI later goes bankrupt See notes 182-196 infra and accompanying text (discussing substantive consolidation).
82. Cf. Easy Case, supra note 15, at 455-56 n.131 (explaining that "[l]enders ... do not make
loans to debtors unless they believe the debtors are viable business entities"). The same type of
credit analysis that is applicable to lending is also applicable to leasing. See Electronic mail from
John D. Forsyth, Professor of Finance, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, to Thomas R.
Loeser, author's research assistant (Sept 29, 1998) (on file with author); J. FRED WESTON &
THOMAS E. COPELAND, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 1000-04 (9th ed. 1992) (applying the same credit
analysis to leasing and lending credit decisions).
83. FI might go bankrupt because it would be unable to pay any significant debts that might
accrue, and thus creditors on those debts could force FI into involuntary bankruptcy on the basis
that it "is generaIly not paying [its] debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute." II U.S.C. § 303(h)(I) (1988) (setting forth involuntary bankruptcy
standards). I later discuss that judgment proofing and the consequent risk of bankruptcy impose
costs on FI itself, which FI would have to subtract from 1:1. See notes 120-123 infra and accompanyingtext
84. Bankruptcy automatically stays FI's obligation to pay those rentals even if it has the income to do so. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. 1999). If FI continues to use the leased assets,
it only has to pay F2 for their reasonable use value, an amount which is likely to be significantly
less than above-market lease rentals. See, e.g., In re ICS Cybernetics, Inc., 111 B.R. 32, 40-41
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989). Ultimately, F1 must either assume (affirm) or reject (terminate) the lease.
See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). If FI rejects the lease, F2 receives the assets back but takes the risk
that the value of the returned assets (their "residual value") might be low. (F2 also would have a
pre-petition unsecured claim for breach, but its recovery on that claim likewise may be low.) If F2
assumes the lease, FI wiIl be paid its rentals. See II U.S.C. § 365(b) (1988 & Supp. 1999); DAVID
G. EpSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 5-5 (1993). However, FI wiIl
assume a lease only where the rentals payable for the leased assets are less than the market cost of
renting equivalent assets. That is, of course, unlikely where the rentals under the original lease are
above market
85. Cf. notes 117-118 infra and accompanying text (analyzing the relationship between the
amount that F2 would demand as compensation and the amount that F1 would be willing to pay).
86. F2 also faces a risk that a bankruptcy court might hold that the underlying sale-leaseback
transaction does not even create a lease. See, e.g., In re PCH Assocs., 804 F.2d 193, 200 (2d Cir.
1986) (holding that the "economic substance" of the sale-leaseback transaction in question did not
create a true lease for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(3), (4».
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ginalize the value of its equity, which may turn out to be worth nothing.
Moreover, by taking ownership of Fl's equity, F2 might make itself liable
for 11.87 Thus, offering F2 a share in Fl's equity likewise does not appear to
be a sufficient incentive to encourage arm's length judgment proofing.
However, the third possible form of compensation-offering F2 a lumpsum payment-might appear to be a viable strategy for judgment proofing.
F2 could require payment as a condition to judgment proofing: Payment
would be made directly or, if Fl does not have the money on hand, by adjusting the purchase price in the sale-Ieaseback. 88
At least where future involuntary claims are expected to be very large,
such as for companies that are subject to mass tort liability, it might seem
that there will be many cases where K will be less than 11 because an arm's
length judgment proofing contract will be entered into where K is less than 11.
But a close analysis of 11 shows, to the contrary, that K may well exceed 11
even in mass tort cases. 11 represents the amount of value that judgment
proofing takes from Fl's future involuntary creditors.89 That amount is not
the amount of future involuntary creditor claims, which can be considerable.
Rather, 11 is limited to the value of Fl's interest in the assets used in its business.90 That is because, absent judgment proofing, Fl's creditors could
claim only against those assets. 91
Fl and F2 therefore will be able to reach a deal only if the amount of
compensation that F2 would require, K, is less than the value of F l' s assets.92
I next show, however, that even if Fl is a company with significant assets, K
may well exceed their value. Although this first appears counterintuitive, it
follows from the recognition that K must at least offset the sizable costs that
87. See notes 183, 186 & 197-199 infra and accornpanying text (discussing the risk thatF2 as
shareholder might becorne directly liable for !J. under theories of substantive consolidation and
piercing the corporate veil).
88. In the second case, if FI sells $1,000,000 of assets to F2 and leases thern back, and the
lurnp-sum cornpensation is $250,000, then F2 would only pay $750,000 as a purchase price for the
assets.
89. See note 78 supra and accornpanying text.
90. Thus, if FI owns an asset outright, the value of its interest in that asset will be equal to the
value of the asset. But if FI rnerely leases an asset, the value of its interest in that asset will depend
on whether FI's lease cost is above or below the cost ofleasing a similar asset.
91. Frorn FI's perspective, !J. is not a revenue but rnerely a potential cost saving, resulting
frorn avoiding creditor claims. Because the rnost F I could save by avoiding claims is the value of
its assets, !J. is necessarily limited to that value even if the amount of future involuntary creditor
claims is greater. Cf S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 lNT'L REv. L. & ECON. 45, 45
(1986) ("An injurer will treat liability that exceeds his assets as imposing an effective financial
penalty only equal to his assets; an injurer with assets of $30 000, for exarnple, will treat an accident resulting in liability of $100 000 identically with an accident resulting in liability of only $30
000.").
92. I later refine this argument by showing that FI and F2 will be able to reach a deal only if
K is significantly less than the value of FI's assets. See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
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judgment proofing would impose on F2. These costs potentially include a
financing premium, increased liability risks, and reputation and agency costs.
A financing premium would apply whenever F2 finances the purchase of
the assets to be leased to F1.93 Because companies rarely have significant
amounts of cash on hand, F2 is very likely to have to finance the purchase of
those assets. Unless F2 is a highly creditworthy company, in which case the
other costs discussed below will be greater,94 the financier customarily would
require the financing to be secured by an assignment of the lease.95 However, if F 1 is judgment proof, its ability to make lease payments is uncertain,
rendering the assignment of the lease almost valueless. F2 then may be unable to obtain financing, in which case the judgment proofing attempt would
fail ab initio.96 Even if F2 could obtain financing, it would have to pay the
financier a significant premium to overcome the credit risk of a judgment
prooflessee.97
Other costs, however, apply whether or not F2 finances its purchase of
the assets to be leased to F 1. I later show that if F2 helps judgment proof F 1,
it may become liable to Fl's creditors under existing law. 98 Those creditors

93. Recall that F2 helps judgment proof Fl by buying its assets and leasing them back. See
note 79 supra and accompanying text
94. See notes 114 & 116 infra and accompanying text (arguing that the more creditworthy F2
is, the greater its reputation and agency costs will be).
95. "Lenders generally will not make loans, secured or otherwise, unless they have 'two ways
out,' meaning two potential methods of repayment One way out may well be the collateral's liquidation value [which, in the case referred to above, would come from a pledge of the assets purchased] but the second way out is usually cash flow [which, in the case referred to above, would
come from an assignment of the lease]." Easy Case, supra note 15, at 455 n.131. Where the market value of the assets could fluctuate, a pledge of the assets alone almost certainly would be insufficient.
96. In another context, Professor LoPucki implicitly aclmowledges the financier's expected
refusal to advance funds. When discussing whether a company's right to do business could be
conditioned on demonstrating financial responsibility as evidenced by the posting of a surety bond,
he argues that no insurer would issue a bond unless the company has sufficient assets to reimburse
the insurerifthe bond is ever paid. See Death o/Liability, supra note 1, at 88.
97. In theory, at least, FI could self-finance F2's purchase by taking back a note from F2 for
the purchase price, thereby eliminating F2's need to obtain financing. FI then could transfer that
note, or interests therein, as a dividend to its shareholders. However, in an arm's length transaction,
self-financing is unlikely. FI ordinarily would want cash for the sale of its assets, and would not
want to take F2's credit risk. A note or other promise to pay offered by F2 would introduce risk
into the valuation of the sale price which would necessarily decrease the amount realized by Fl.
See WESTON ET AL., supra note 82, at 802 ("Ultimately the seller firm bears the risk of nonpayment
when credit is extended.").
98. See notes 179-188 infra and accompanying text (analyzing the theories under which F2
may become liable to FI's creditors). If F2 were a foreign entity ,vithout U.S. contacts, it might be
able to avoid some of this liability, depending on the law of its home jurisdiction. But F2 may
subject itself to jurisdiction and liability anyway if it ever needs to enforce the lease in the U.S.
Moreover, a foreign F2 might face such costs as bad pUblicity (which could prevent F2's future
entry into U.S. markets), additional taxation under its home jurisdiction'S laws, and inability to
finance the purchase of FI's assets because foreign capital sources tend to be smaller than those in
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are likely to want to impose liability because a judgment proof F I will be
unable to pay its creditors, leaving F2 as the only realistic "deep pocket" defendant,99 Therefore, the more creditworthy F2 is, the more likely it will be
named as a defendant,loo
The future claims of FI's creditors against F2 will be difficult to predict
ex ante,IOI and creditors also might be able to recover punitive and treble
damages.1 02 Those claims therefore could exceed K. It appears highly unlikely that F2 would take a business risk that could subject it to another company's liabilities in an amount greater than the compensation received for
taking the risk. Moreover, those claims may even exceed A-which, recall,
is limited to the value of FI's interest in its assets even if the amount offuture involuntary creditor claims is greaterlo3-because FI's creditors could
assert their entire claims againstF2.l 04 Ironically, therefore, the higher FI's
exposure to a large and unpredictable risk (such as mass tort claims), the
greater the deterrent to judgment proofing, because FI's liability would be
limited to A whereas F2's liability might not be so limited.l os
Even where F2 is able to assert technical defenses against liability, such
as defenses based on its separate corporate identity, there is an inherent litigation risk in any lawsuit, particularly where the defendant appears to be enthe u.s. FI itself might be unwilling to sell its assets to a foreign F2 if, under the laws of F2's
home jurisdiction, F I has less assurance that it will be able to continue to use those assets.
99. Unless FI's shareholders were involved in the judgment proofing, lawsuits against them
for return of dividend payments are unlikely to be successful because of limited shareholder liability. Furthermore, if FI has numerous shareholders, they might be difficult to locate and the amount
of the claim against each might not be worth the cost oflitigating that claim.
100. See, e.g., John Leo, It's a Tort World After All, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 17,
1998, at 6 (referring to tort litigation arising from a fire at the Dupont Plaza Hotel in Puerto Rico:
"Following the time-honored deep pockets strategy, lawyers for victims did not sue the perpetrators
[who were unhappy union members employed by the hotel]. They sued hundreds of companies that
made various hotel items that burned on the scene."). Thus, a low likelihood that F2 will have to
pay the financing premium referred to in the prior paragraph is offset by a high likelihood that F2
will bear the costs referred to in this paragraph.
101. By ex ante, I mean at the time that judgment proofing occurs, as opposed to a later time
when future involuntary claims arise. Contracts are made based on ex ante, not ex post, expectatious. For example, "if a contract calls for the delivery of wheat on a fixed date at $3 a bushel, the
fact that on that date the market price is $6 will not operate to discharge the contract." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.4, at 115 (5th ed. 1998).
102. See notes 209 & 228 infra and accompanying text (explaining thatFl's creditors may be
able to claim punitive damages against F2 on a tort theory and treble damages under RICO).
103. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
104. See text accompanying notes 162-255 infra (describing the theories under which FI's
creditors could assert their entire claims against F2). In KM C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., for example, the defendant, based on a refusal to lend $800,000, was held liable for the plaintiff's damages
of $7.5 million. 757 F.2d 752, 754-55 (6th Cir. 1985).
105. F2's liability would not be so limited where the value of its assets exceeds Il. Thus, any
argument that a company could have such inherently high risks that its judgment proofing benefits
exceed its costs would be fallacious.
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gaging in morally culpable action.I 06 If F2 ultimately is likely to win the
litigation, F2 still may prefer to settle than to take the litigation risk, and settlement costs can be significant. 107 F2 therefore will require additional compensation, such as a risk premium, that offsets these risks.I 08
F2 also may require compensation for potential reputation and agency
costs.I09 The former is caused by the bad publicity arising out of judgment
proofing and includes the following risks: that F2's debt rating may be lowered by rating agencies, impairing F2's ability to obtain capital market financing;110 that consumers may refuse to buy F2's products for fear that F2
will not stand behind its warranties (or provide future parts and services);
that F2 may have difficulty obtaining trade credit;1l1 that F2 may impair its
relationships ,vith governmental entities; and that F2 and its officers and directors may even become subject to criminal liability, including under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").ll2 The more
106. I am not arguing that any of the claims against F2 need succeed, only that they create a
risk of liability in a context where (because recovery of the dividend from FI's shareholders is less
likely) F2 would be the most exposed deep pocket.
107. Cf Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 530 (1991) (arguing that directors and officers are invariably
sued in their individual capacities, even when the entity defendants are fully able to respond in
damages, in part because "they can be counted on to be powerful advocates for settlement because
they are more risk-averse than the entity defendants"). Settlement would also let F2 avoid paying
counsel fees and suffering potentially adverse pUblicity.
108. Although F2, like all businesses, takes ordinary business risks in order to earn profits,
the risk associated with judgment proofing exceeds those ordinary risks. If F2 is unable to assess
correctly the judgment proofing risk, it may charge a risk premium. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK
& DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 52 (1991).
109. The term agency costs refers to costs resulting from the inherent conflict of interest between a firm and its managers. Managers, for example, want job security and high income whether
or not those goals benefit the firm. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10
(1976) (analyzing agency costs).
110. Rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's Ratings Group and Moody's Investors
Service, Inc., might downgrade the debt rating of a company that helps another company become
judgment proof because aiding and abetting a judgment proofing can expose a company to significant liabilities. See notes 207-227 infra and accompanying text (analyzing those liabilities). The
downgraded company then will find it more difficult to issue debt securities to obtain capital market
financing. See Alchemy, supra note 21, at 134 n.4, 136-38 (describing capital markets and rating
agencies, and explaining the relationship between a company's debt rating and its ability to obtain
capital market financing).
Ill. Trade credit, which is measured by the willingness of suppliers to extend goods and
services to a company on credit, is essential to the successful operation of most businesses. See
:MITCHELL A. PETERSEN & RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, TRADE CREDIT: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 1
(National Bureau ofEcon. Research Working Paper No. 5602, 1996) (observing that "[t]rade credit
is the single most important source of short term external finance for firms in the United States");
Foragingfor Finance, CHEMIST & DRUGGIST, Mar. 7, 1998, at 21,22 ("Trade credit is an essential
form of finance .•. .'1.
112. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1984 & Supp.
1999). See notes 228-250 infra and accompanying text for a description of how RICO applies to
judgment proofing.
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creditworthy F2 is, the greater will be its reputational harm and therefore the
higher will be its reputational costs. Thus, a low likelihood that F2 will have
to pay the financing premium referred to abovell3 is offset by a high likelihood that F2 will require compensation to offset reputational costs.1l 4
Agency costs will arise out of the risk that F2 might go bankrupt as a result of becoming embroiled in a lawsuit by Fl's creditors, possibly causing
F2's managers to lose their jobs.1 1S Those managers therefore will want F2
to be paid greater compensation, which presumably would be channeled in
whole or in part into management compensation. Some managers may even
refuse to engage in the risk notwithstanding compensation.1 16 The more
creditworthy F2 is, the higher will be these agency costs because F2's managers will have more at stake in keeping their jobs. Thus, as before, a low
likelihood that F2 will have to pay the financing premium is offset by a high
likelihood that F2 will require compensation to offset agency costs. Also,
whether or not F2 is creditworthy, additional agency costs will arise because
F2's officers and directors are likely to want to avoid criminal liability under
RICO and, because of the stigma, may even want to avoid being named in a
lawsuit alleging RICO violations.
As a result of these costs, F2 will require compensation, te, that may well
exceed.6.. Moreover, whether or not te exceeds .6., te is even more likely to
exceed the portion of.6. that Fl would be willing to pay F2 for the judgment
proofing. It would be irrational for Fl to offer compensation to F2 that approaches.6., the value of Fl's assets.ll7 Delta is the most that Fl could lose
absent judgment proofing. Yet F l' s cost-saving from judgment proofing is
speculative because F l' s operations may never give rise to material future
involuntary claims.ll8

113. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
114. Professor LoPucki discounts reputational costs as a constraint on judgment proofing, but
his analysis is incomplete because it focuses only on the public relations costs of "typical business[es] with assets wortb $500,000 to $1 million." Death o/Liability, supra note 1, at 52-53.
115. See Easy Case, supra note 15, at 459-60 & nn.154-57 (referring to two studies reporting
that only a minority of incumbent corporate managers and directors remains in office following a
corporate reorganization; none remains in office after a liquidation).
116. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection 0/ Default Rules for
Remote Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 561 (1990) ("If ... investment in risky ventures can produce
career-threatening losses, a manager is likely to avoid the risk, notwithstanding its e},:pected value
or its probability distribution.").
117. Recall that tl is limited to the value of assets, whether owned or leased, that F 1 uses in its
business. See note 90 supra and accompanying text
118. Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case/or the Priority o/Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 1279, 1340
(1997) (arguing, among other things, that the transaction costs associated with setting up a parentsubsidiary strategy are borne 100% of the time whereas the strategy's liability-avoiding benefits are
enjoyed only a small fraction of the time). To reduce the effect of speculation, I considered whether
FI and F2 would contract ex ante for compensation to be paid ex post based on the actual amount
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Judgment proofing also imposes its own set of costs on FI, which FI
would have to subtract from Il. I already have mentioned that F I would have
to pay taxes on income derived from the sale of its assets to F2.119 Judgment
proofing also would take away Fl's ability to obtain liquidity and survive a
troubled situation,12o as a result of which unpaid liabilities can easily drive
FI into banlauptcy. Banlauptcy might subject FI's shareholders to substantive consolidation and other equitable remedies.1 21 Banlauptcy also would
impose particularly high agency costs because, having no assets with which
to reorganize, FI almost certainly would liquidate in bankruptcy, depriving
managers of their jobs.1 22 Furthermore, Fl's managers and directors may
incur personal, and possibly criminal, liability for judgment-proofing the
company.123 These costs detract from any value that FI otherwise would see
in judgment proofing.
As an economic matter, therefore, arm's length judgment proofing is a
dubious strategy. If F2 is unable to finance the purchase of Fl's assets, the
judgment proofing attempt would fail ab initio.1 24 Even where the fmancing
is feasible, the ability of FI and F2 to reach agreement on compensation is

of future involuntary claims. If the amount of those claims is smaIl, the compensation would be
smaIl, but if the amount of those claims is large, the compensation also would be large. Such an
agreement wiII not work, however, because FI's obligation to pay compensation is directly proportional-whereas its financial ability to pay compensation is inversely proportional-to the amount
of those claims. Thus, in the case where compensation is large, FI wiIl have no ability to pay it
119. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text (discussing tax treatment of an arm's
length sale-leaseback transaction).
120. See White, supra note 10, at 1397 (arguing that a judgment proofed firm would have
"trouble meeting its interest and principal obligations any time it suffered losses for even a short
period").
121. See notes 185-199 infra and accompanying text (discussing shareholder risk of substantive consolidation, especiaIly where shareholders participate in the judgment proofing such as by
guarantying Fl's lease obligations).
122. Viewed from the standpoint of a manager wanting to keep her job, ensuring that the
company wiII be able to continue operating during a downturn is a more important incentive than
maximizing shareholder value through judgment proofing. Of course, F I could offer its managers a
portion of tl as compensation for the risk, but the larger the portion offered, the less available to pay
to F2 as compensation.
123. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 18 & n.46, 19 (1986) (citing examples where corporate managers were
sued as a result of taking actions that led to insolvency or corporate distress); see also notes 228250 infra and accompanying text (discussing the application of RICO to judgment proofing).
124. On the other hand, the innovative arm's length business transactions that are alleged to
lead to judgment proofing actuaIly can lead to increased efficiency. Asset securitization, for example, enables companies to obtain lower-cost financing than they would otherwise be able to obtain.
See Alchemy, supra note 21, at 134, 140; Frost, supra note 21, at 129 (arguing that inefficiencies
involved with bankruptcy reorganizations are among the reasons why securitization aIlows for
lower-cost financing than the simpler approach of secured finance and that securitization produces
real savings that could be shared by all investors).
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questionable 12s because the value of judgment proofing to FI may well be
less than the costs it would impose on F2.1 26
These economic conclusions are strengthened by observations from social psychology. Because economic analysis alone is sometimes not an accurate predictor of human behavior,127 I have considered how people may behave when confronted with risky decisions. A leading model of such behavior, "prospect theory,"128 predicts that individuals who are performing
above the success level that they seek to achieve (their "aspiration level")
will prefer lower risk options, rather than comparing the expected values of
different altematives.1 29 Thus, so long as F2's managers are operating the
company at their aspiration level-which Professor Coffee defines as "that

125. This is not to say that in individual cases judgment proofing will not occur. People do
take risks and often act irrationally. Nonetheless, without evidence to the contrary, one should not
assume that irrationality will be systematic.
126. Professor LoPucki has suggested, however, that as more companies engage injudgment
proofing, its costs will decline and it will become more prevalent. See Death of Liability, supra
note 1, at 44-45. My analysis does not indicate that any of those costs, other than possibly reputational cost, is likely to decline. Certainly the most significant cost, potential liability to Fl's creditors, would be completely unaffected.
127. "[E]xpected utility theory is not a good description of actual decisionmaking." Jolls et
aI., supra note 8, at 1478.
128. "There has been an explosion of research in recent years trying to develop better formal
models of actual decisionmaking. The model offered by KaImeman and Tversky, called prospect
theory, seems to do a good job of explaining many features of observed behavior ...." [d. at 1478.
Prospect theory is an outgrowth of subjective expected utility theory, which itself augments expected utility theory by taking into account subjective value and risk to the decision-maker. See
generally Lola L. Lopes, Psychology and Economics: Perspectives on Risk, Cooperation, and the
Marketplace, ANN. REv. PSYCHOL., Jan. 1, 1994, at 197.
129. See generally Peter C. Fishburn, Mean-Risk Analysis with Risk Associated with BelowTarget Returns, 67 AM. EcON. REv. 116 (1977) (describing models for choice among investment
options that predict a strong effect of target returns); Daniel KaImeman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: An Analysis ofDecision Under Risk, 47 EcONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (introducing prospect
theory); Amos Tversky & Daniel KaImeman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992) [hereinafter Advances in Prospect
Theory] (developing cumulative prospect theory and introducing the theory ofloss aversion); John
W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn & Roy Crum, Translation of Gambles and Aspiration Level Effects in
Risky Choice Behavior, 26 MGMT. SCI. 1039 (1980) (extending KaImeman & Tversky's model to
incorporate a target point reference); John W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn & Roy Crum, Further
Tests of Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior, 27 MGMT. SCI. 953 (1981) (further
extending the target point model). For examples of applications of prospect theory to corporate
decisionmaking, see also Coffee, supra note 123, at 64-66. Studies have found that individuals wiII
prefer higher risk options when they are performing below their aspiration level: "[I]ndividuals
move from being risk preferrers to risk averters, or vice versa, depending on whether they are performing above or below their aspiration level." [d. at 64; see also John W. Payne, Dan J. Laughhunn & Roy Crum, Managerial Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 26 MGMT. SCI. 1238,
1246 (1980) (considering the impact of ruinous loss considerations on risk preferences); James D.
Cox, Heroes in the Law: Alford v. Shaw, 66 N.C. L. REv. 565, 578 (1988) (arguing that when the
predicted outcomes of most of the choices confronting managers fall below their desired target
level, the managers will "select the more risky options out of an apparent hope they may be able to
achieve a result above the target point").
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level of profits that protect[s] [management] from ouster"130-they will seek
to avoid the high risks associated with judgment proofing Fl. While there
will be cases where F2's managers are performing below their aspiration
level,l3l judgment proofing Fl for compensation will be only one of many
high-risk strategies that the managers might consider. Because the foregoing
economic analysis has shown it to be an economically dubious strategy and
one that introduces other risks of job loss as well as of criminal liability,
judgment proofing even then is unlikely to be the strategy of choice.132
A further development of prospect theory, referred to as "loss aversion,"
confirms that arm's length judgment proofing is unlikely to succeed.133 Research has shown that people's risk attitudes toward a particular task depend
on whether they perceive a potential gain or loss from engaging in the task.
Tasks for which a person perceives potential gains typically produce riskaverse behavior, whereas tasks for which a person perceives potential losses
yield risk-seeking behavi0r.1 34 For example,13S if someone has a choice between, on the one hand, a sure gain of $50 and, on the other hand, a 50%
chance of ,vinning $100 and a 50% chance of ,vinning nothing, he will take
the sure gain, even though the expected value of both choices is equal.I 36
But if that same person is put to a choice between, on the one hand, a sure
loss of $50 and, on the other hand, a 50% chance of losing $100 and a 50%

130. Coffee, supra note 123, at 65 (applying prospect theory to management decision making).
131. Professor Coffee has queried whether the advent of hostile takeovers has caused senior
managers of "large public corporations" to "subjectively feel that they are performing below the
necessary level of profitability that will protect them from ouster." Id. If F2 is a large public corporation, however, the reputation costs of judgment proofing would be extremely high, whereas the
amount of compensation that F2 could derive therefrom would probably have an insignificant impact on F2 's profitability. It therefore is unlikely that F2 would be a large public corporation.
132. Professor Langevoort has suggested that corporations typically undertake projects posing
ambiguous initial risks with a commitment to monitor the project, so that it can be abandoned at
relatively low cost should difficulties or risks surface. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 165-66.
Judgment proofing, however, is not such a project: The ambiguity of risk remains until the judgment proofing is challenged, at which point the costs may be very high and unavoidable. Furthermore, if F2 is so unprofitable that its managers are in danger of ouster, it seems unlikely that F2
would have the financial wherewithal to purchase FI's assets in the sale-leaseback that precedes a
judgment proofing.
133. See Advances in Prospect Theory, supra note 129, at 298 (defining "loss aversion" as a
basic phenomenon of choice in which "losses loom larger than gains").
134. See Linda Babcock, Henry S. Farber, Cynthia Fobian & Eldar Shafir, Forming Beliefs
About Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, IS lNT'L REv. L. &
BeON. 289, 290, 296-97 (1995); Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future ofthe
Law, 1997 WIS. L. REv. 433, 459-60 (1997).
135. The author is grateful to Professor Thomas Ulen for suggesting these examples. See
electronic mail from Thomas Ulen, Alumni Distinguished Professor of Law, University of lllinois
at Urbana-Champaign, to Steven L. Schwarcz (Oct. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
136. The expected value of the sure gain is S50 (S50 x 100%). The expected value of the possibility of winning also is S50 (S100 x 50% + SO x 50%).
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chance of losing nothing, he will prefer the possibility of loss over the sure
loss even though, again, the expected value of both choices is equal. I37
Ann's length transactions are voluntary. F2 therefore would enter into
an ann's length judgment proofing transaction, if at all, solely for gain.
Hence, the doctrine of loss aversion predicts that F2 would be risk averse in
negotiating the terms of that transaction. F2's risk aversion would raise the
amount of compensation that F2 would demand, thereby decreasing the likelihood that Fl and F2 will be able to agree on a mutually acceptable level of
compensation.138
I next show, however, that judgment proofing is more likely to be a concern in the structuring of non-arm's length transactions.
C.

The Structuring ofNon-Arm 's Length Business Transactions Is More
Likely to Give Rise to Judgment Proofing

Non-arm's length judgment proofing transactions can be represented by
a generic structure in which Fl (the company being judgment proofed) and
F2 (the company helping to judgment proof Fl)139 are now related by common ownership through a third entity, F3.I 40 F3 may be a company, an individual, or any other entity; for simplicity, I will refer to F3 as a company, but
the same consequences flow irrespective of F3's actual identity. This ge-

137. The expected value of the sure loss is $50 ($50 x 100%). The expected value of the possibility oflosing also is $50 ($100 x 50% + $0 x 50%).
138. Although one case superficially appears to represent an arm's length judgment proofing
transaction, the actual judgment proofing transfer was clearly not arm's length. In Schmoll v.
Acands, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988), affd 977 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1992), Raymark Industries Inc. attempted to avoid asbestos-related liability by engaging in an "elaborate transfer of assets," id. at 873, with the final transfer being made to an apparently independent company, Asbestos
Litigation Management ("ALM"), see id. at 871. A close analysis, however, shows that the final
transfer was not essential to the judgment proofing. Rather, the judgment proofing was consummated by the next-to-last transfer, which occurred when Raytech Corporation, the indirect ovmer of
100% of Raymark's shares, caused Raymark to sell its valuable assets to Raytech for inadequate
consideration, consisting primarily of worthless stock and unsecured promissory notes of Raytech.
See id. at 871-72 (describing step five of the six-part judgment proofing transaction, after which
Raytech owned all ofRaymark's valuable assets while Raymark retained all of the asbestos-related
liabilities). The final, and only arguably arm's length, transfer consisted of a sale by Raytech to
ALM of the stock of Raymark. That sale, however, apparently was undertaken merely to sever the
corporate chain between Raytech and Raymark and did not worsen the ability of asbestos claimants
to recover their claims from Raymark. In any event, a court in subsequent related litigation found
that Raytech and ALM were related by certain common management and stock ownership and
questioned whether the final transfer was actually arm's length. See Raytech Corp. v. White, 54
F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1995) (questioning the "bona fides of the sale ofRaymark to ALM").
139. As before, the same overall consequences would obtain if F2 represented more than one
company. I therefore only need to refer to a "collective" F2 in the generic structure.
140. If F1 and F2 are owned by F3, FI and F2 would be referred to as "sister companies."
Alternatively, F3 could own F2, which in tum owns Fl.
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neric structure incorporates the parent-subsidiary ownership structure previously discussed141 as well as LoPucki's "essential structure."142
There are two approaches by which non-arm's length transactions could
be used for judgment proofing. In one approach, F3 establishes Fl as an
undercapitalized operating company and causes F2 to acquire assets to be
used by Fl.I 43 F2 then leases those assets to Fl. Alternatively, if Fl already
owns its operating assets, F3 could cause F 1 to sell those assets to F2 and to
lease them back. In either case, the structure creates a risk of judgment
proofing in which F l' s operations have the potential for generating liabilities
thatFl, ,vith its minimal owned assets, would be unable to pay.I44
Non-arm's length transactions are more likely than arm's length transactions to be entered into for judgment proofing. If Fl and F2, which are related companies, are part of the same consolidated tax group, a saleleaseback between them will not be subject to federal taxation.I 45 Moreover,
whereas arm's length transactions involve unrelated companies which try to
maximize the value each will receive from a transaction, related companies
may want to maximize their aggregate corporate wealth, thereby making
judgment proofing easier. To understand why, compare the earlier analysis
of unrelated companies, again letting Ll stand for the amount of value that

141. The parent-subsidiary ownership structure is simply the generic structure taking away
F2, so that F3 owns only Fl. The only difference that would make to my analysis is that F3 would
be an active participant in judgment proofing Fl and therefore may be subject to greater liability
than in the generic structure. Judgment proofing is therefore more likely to occur in the generic
structure than in the simple parent-subsidiary ownership structure.
142. Recall that LoPucki's "essential structure" is a "symbiotic relationship between two or
more entities [represented by Fl, F2, and F3 in my generic non-arm's length structure], in which
one of the entities [Fl] generates disproportionately high risks ofliability and another [F2] owns a
disproportionately high level of assets. Through the contract that unites them [F3's mutual ownership of FI and F2], the two entities allocate between them the gains from judgment proofing."
Essential Structure, supra note 2, at 149.
143. F2 already may be sufficiently capitalized to acquire these assets. If not, F2 could acquire the assets from the proceeds of a stock offering or borrowing. I previously argued, in an
arm's length context, that F2 would have difficulty borrowing if FI is judgment proof. See note 96
supra and accompanying text In a non-arm's length context, however, F3 (if creditworthy) could
make it easier for F2 to borrow by guaranteeing F2's repayment obligation.
144. That risk would be minimized if Fl's directors have an obligation to consider the company's potential future involuntary creditors. See notes 200-206 infra and accompanying text (discussing the risk of judgment proofing if directors have no obligation to future involuntary creditors).
145. If Fl and F2 are part of an "affiliated" group-which roughly requires at least 80%
common ownership, with a common parent corporation (F3 in my example)-that files consolidated returns, then the gain on sale may be deferred for federal income tax purposes. See I.R.C. §§
1502-1504 (1988 & Supp. 1999); Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-13 (as amended in 1997). In contrast, FI
would have to pay federal taxes on the income from a sale of assets to an unrelated F2. See note 54
supra and accompanying text (discussing taxation of an arm's length sale-leaseback transaction).
Even in a non-arm's length structure, however, there may be recognition of gain for state income
tax purposes if combined reporting is not permitted under the applicable state law.
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judgment proofing takes from Fl's creditors,146 If Fl and F2 are unrelated,
Fl would attempt to judgment proof itself only so long as the amount of
compensation that F2 would require to help it do so is less than ~,147 I have
shown, however, that that amount of compensation may well exceed ~ and is
even more likely to exceed the portion of ~ that Fl would be willing to pay,
making arm's length judgment proofing unlikely to occur,148 In contrast, if
Fl and F2 are related, their mutual shareholder, F3, could request F2 to help
in the judgment proofing whether or not F2 is separately compensated,149
Thus, the previous analysis of whether Fl and F2 could agree on compensation is irrelevant. Instead, non-arm's length judgment proofing would be
rational so long as its benefit, ~, exceeds any cost to F 1, F2, and F3.
To determine whether ~ exceeds the cost to Fl, F2, and F3, we must
again examine the costs of judgment proofing, now in a related-company
context. Although it might appear that all of Fl's and F2's costs, previously
discussed in an arm's length context,150 would be applicable, the following
analysis shows that only some of those costs would apply. On the other hand,
F3 itself may incur direct costs.
The financing premium discussed in an arm's length context151 might be
less likely to apply in a non-arm's length transaction. Moreover, F2's potentialliability to Fl's future involuntary creditors may represent a relatively
small cost if F3, the common owner of Fl and F2, prefers the possibility of
liability against F2 to the greater certainty of liability against Fl,152 Al146. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
147. See id.
148. Therefore unrelated-company judgment proofing is unlikely to occur. See notes 117-118
supra and accompanying text.
149. F2's directors generally have an obligation to maximize value for the shareholder, F3.
See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939). Judgment proofing Fl arguably would accomplish
that. Nonetheless, there may be doubt as to the obligations of F2's directors. F3's value would be
partly generated from the increased value of Fl's shares, and it is unclear whether a director has an
obligation to maximize shareholder value by taking steps that would increase the value of stock
held by the shareholder in other companies. Furthermore, if F2 is rendered insolvent, F2's directors
may be violating their dual fiduciary obligation to F2's creditors. See notes 200-206 infra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 93-126 supra and accompanying text (examining the costs of arm's length
judgment proofing).
151. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text (discussing the financing premium in an
arm's length context). There are several reasons why F2 might be able to avoid paying that premium in a non-arm's length transaction. If a creditworthy F3 guarantees F2's financing obligations, the financier might waive the premium. F3 itself might be able to finance F2 directly (raising
the issue, of course, of whether F3 must pay a premium for its own financing). Ultimately, the
applicability of a financing premium will be a question of fact.
152. See notes 207-220 infra and accompanying text (discussing why F2 may become liable
to Fl's creditors). Whether F3 prefers the possibility of liability against F2 to the greater certainty
of liability against F1 will depend, among other factors, on the relative values of F1 and F2. All
other factors being equal, the smaller F2's value compared to Fl's value, the more likely that F3
will try to shift the risk to F2.
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though F1 and F2 still will suffer reputation and agency costs, those costs, if
confined to Fl and F2, may be relatively unimportant. For example, F3
might not care about Fl's or F2's reputation so long as its own reputation is
unaffected. And if Fl or F2 is forced to liquidate, its officers may well be
able to find jobs with F3.
F3 also may become directly subject to claims by Fl's creditors, through
the doctrines of piercing the corporate veil and substantive consolidation, for
example.l 53 Furthennore, F3's officers and directors might be concerned
about the risk of criminal liability under RICO)54 Nonetheless, the likelihood that F3 and its officers and directors will become subject to liability
might be somewhat attenuated if F3's involvement in the judgment proofing
is passive rather than (as F2's involvement would be) direct and active.l 55
For example, in Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd.,156 a
case involving a judgment proofing structure that resembles this article's generic Fl-F2-F3 structure, a court extended Fl creditor liability against the
company representing F2 but did not consolidate the entities representing
F3.t 57
Because F3 is uncertain whether it will be subject to liability, it cannot
know ex ante in a non-arm's length judgment proofing whether fl will exceed costs. Social psychology predicts, however, that related companies,
such as Fl, F2, and F3, will be risk prone. Recall that the doctrine ofloss
aversion demonstrates that potential gains produce risk-averse behavior but
potential losses produce risk-seeking behavior.l 58 In an arm's length transaction, F2 would engage in judgment proofing solely for gain, in the fonn of
compensation. Therefore F2 would be risk averse.t 59 But in anon-arm's
length transaction, F3 would try to avoid losses from future involuntary
claims. Because F3 owns Fl, any loss to Fl represents a loss to F3. 160 Loss
153. See notes 179-199 infra and accompanying text (explaining why F3 may become liable
to Fl's creditors under those doctrines).
154. See notes 228-250 infra and accompanying text (describing the application of RICO to
judgment proofing).
155. F3's involvement would not be passive, however, where it guarantees Fl's lease obligations.
156. 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991).
157. See note 196 infra (discussing Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd. and
noting that the issue of whether F3 should be consolidated did not even appear to be raised).
158. See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
160. To say that F3 is avoiding losses depends, of course, on F3's perspective, which ultimately is subjective. Assume, for example, that the expected value of future involuntary claims
against FI is Sx. F3 logically would engage in judgment proofing, if at all, in order to avoid that
loss. It is not inconceivable, however, that some F3s might implicitly deduct $X from Fl's value
based on the expectation of future claims. Those F3's would view judgment proofing as creating a
gain of $x, and therefore would be risk averse. A crude analogy might be made to the shopping
philosophy of the Dickens character, Richard Jamdyce, who, when dissuaded "from making any

32

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

aversion predicts that F3 will be more likely to take risks to avoid those
losses.I 61 Thus, judgment proofing is more likely to occur in a non-arm's
length than in an arm's length context.
Nonetheless, where existing law fails as an ex ante deterrent to judgment
proofing, it still may have an ex post remedial impact by requiring F2 and F3
to pay Fl's liabilities. I next analyze how judgment proofing is regulated.
D. Regulation ofJudgment Proofing Under Existing Law

Existing law regulates judgment proofing in two ways. It restricts the
ability of insolvent companies to give away their assets, thereby limiting a
company's (in this case, Fl's) ability to judgment proof itself. It also imposes costs on the parties (in this case, Fl, F2, and, in the case of non-arm's
length judgment proofing, F3, as well as their officers, directors, and possibly shareholders) participating in the judgment proofing, such as by making
them potentially liable to Fl's creditors. Of special relevance in this context
are bankruptcy law (fraudulent conveyance and substantive consolidation),
corporate law (piercing the corporate veil and the duties of directors), tort
law (lender liability and prima facie torts), and criminal law (including
RICO).

Fraudulent conveyance law, which generally restricts the ability of insolvent companies to dispose of their assets for less than reasonably equivalent
value,162 represents the first-and arguably also the secondl63-type of

purchase that he had in contemplation which was particularly unnecessary and expensive ... took
credit for what it would have cost and made out that to spend anything less on someIhing else was
to save the difference." CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 261 (Stephen Gill ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1996) (1853).
161. F3's increased propensity to take risks is suggested by the similarity between F3's
choices and the choices of subjects in loss-aversion experiments. In a typical such experiment,
subjects, initially "given" $500, were offered a choice between (x), a 50% chance to lose $200 and a
50% chance to lose noIhing, and (Y), a sure loss of only $100. Sixty-four percent of the subjects
chose (x), the riskier option; only 36% chose (Y), the more conservative option. See RICHARD H.
THALER, QUASI RATIONAL EcONOMICS 143 (1991) (describing loss-aversion experiments conducted by Professors TverskY and Kabneman). In my hypothetical, F3 has the choice between not
judgment proofing, which represents a sure loss equal to the amount of future involuntary claims,
and judgment proofing, which represents a chance of losing more than the amount of future involuntary claims (due to potential punitive damages and criminal liability) and a chance of losing
nothing. Although the analogy obviously is imprecise because F3's choice will depend on the
numbers associated with these variables, it at least suggests that under a range of numbers, F3
might be willing to choose the former, riskier option.
162. Fraudulent conveyance law is both federal and state law. The federal law is articulated
in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(I) (1993 & Supp. 1999), in part as follows:
The trustee [in bankruptcy] may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property ...
that was made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
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regulation.I 64 To understand how it represents the first type of regulation,
consider the hypothetical in which Fl attempts to judgment proof itself by
transferring its assets to F2.I 65 If that transfer is made with actual intent (as
would appear to be the case with judgment proofing) to hinder, delay, or defraud Fl's creditors--or, even absent such intent, if such transfer leaves Fl
with insufficient assets to pay its debts and Fl does not receive reasonably
equivalent value in return-the transfer could be avoided under fraudulent
conveyance law whether Fl and F2 are related or unrelated companies.I 66
Fraudulent conveyance law even explicitly protects future creditors, whose
claims are not in existence at the time of the transfer.I 67 Moreover, fraudulent conveyance law applies to any kind of transfer, including payment of

(A) made such transfer ... with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity [that
is, any creditor] to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was
made ... , indebted; or
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer ... ;
and
[either was insolvent or had an unreasonable small capital or intended to incur, or believed it would incur, debts beyond its ability to pay as such debts matured].
Fraudulent conveyance law also is articulated in state law in three general forms: common law
dating back to the sixteenth century English Statute of Elizabeth, An Acte agaynst fraudulent
Deedes Gyftes Alienations, &c., 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.); unifonn state law based on the Unifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which remains in effect in six states, see James J. Cunningham &
Marsha E. Simms, Acquisition Financing, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ASSET-BASED FINANCING 387, 400 (1998); and unifonn state law based on the more recent Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer
Act, which is in effect in 37 states, see id. Most state fraudulent conveyance laws are based on the
Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act, which is intended to be consistent with Bankruptcy Code § 548.
See id. I therefore will focus on § 548.
163. See notes 171-173 infra and accompanying text (arguing that fraudulent conveyance law
also represents the second type of regulation because it may require F2 to return to FJ the assets
that F2 purchases in a sale-leaseback transaction).
164. This regulation is not unlimited, however. Fraudulent conveyance law is subject to a
statute oflimitations of one year under federal law, see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(I) (1993 & Supp. 1999),
and usually longer under state law (four years for states following the Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer
Act, six years for those following the Unifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act). Thus, in the unlikely
event that a judgment-proofed company survives past the longest applicable statute of limitations,
typically four to sLx years, the act ofjudgment proofing no longer would be subject to avoidance as
a fraudulent conveyance. Nonetheless, the analysis below shows that other legal restrictions could
then apply.
165. See notes 79-91 supra and accompanying text.
166. See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1981) (observing
that federal fraudulent transfer law can void transfers between related companies). If FJ does receive reasonably equivalent value, it could then judgment proof itself by turning that value over to
its shareholders in the fonn of a dividend.
167. Section 548(a)(I)(A) specifically provides that the trustee may avoid any transfer if the
debtor made such transfer \vith "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the
debtor ... became [indebted] on or after the date that such transfer was made." 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(I)(A) (1993 & Supp. 1999) (emphasis added). Sections 548(a)(I)(B)(ii)(II) and (III) apply,
respectively, to debtors about to engage in business or transactions for which their property remaining is an unreasonably small capital and to debtors intending to incur, or believing they will
incur, debts that are beyond their ability to pay as such debts mature.
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dividends 168-the kind ofiransfer that I show is the real problem injudgment
proofing.1 69 Thus, fraudulent conveyance law limits Fl's ability to judgment-proof itself in the first place.170
Fraudulent conveyance law also could represent the second type of
regulation, one which imposes costs on a party participating in the judgment
proofing-in this case, on F2. The rationale underlying a leading fraudulent
conveyance case, United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp. (In re Gleneagles Investment CO.),171 would require F2 to return to Fl the assets that F2
purchases in a sale-leaseback transaction-even if F2 had paid reasonably
equivalent value for them. That return would impose a cost on F2 because it
would be unable to recover the purchase price from Fl, which is judgment
proof.1 72 In Tabor, a financial institution which made a loan as part of a leveraged buyout "knew, or should have known, that the money it lent ... was
used, in part, to" pay shareholders of the borrower.173 The Third Circuit
agreed with the district court's finding that the loan and the subsequent payment of loan proceeds to shareholders were "part of one integrated transaction" and held that, under state fraudulent conveyance law, the "$4,085,000
in ... loan proceeds ... were merely passed through the [borrower to its ultimate shareholders] and cannot be deemed consideration received by the
168. See, e.g., In re Dondi Fin. Corp., 119 B.R. 106, 113 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding
that "a dividend payment made while the debtor corporation was insolvent is a fraudulent conveyance" under state fraudulent conveyance law); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 87 B.R. 154, 161 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1988) (holding that "the allegations set forth in Kaiser's amended complaint [that payment of
dividends was a fraudulent transfer under the constructive fraud provisions of § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as under state fraudulent conveyance law] are sufficient to state claims for
relief' under such laws); In re Jenkins Landscaping & Excavating, Inc., 93 B.R. 84, 88 (BanIa-.
W.D. Va. 1988) (voiding dividends issued with intent to defraud creditors); Powers v. Heggie, 167
N.E. 314, 317 (Mass. 1929) (holding that dividend payments by insolvent corporations are fraudulent); Cox ET AL., supra note 59, § 20.26, at 20.76 & n.13 (arguing that "[d]ividends as well as
share repurchases made by an insolvent corporation easily fit within the proscription of' fraudulent
conveyance law, and that "[t]he shares ofa corporation on the verge of insolvency are of very little,
if any, value, so distribution of a dividend to stockholders is presumed to lack fair equivalency");
William T. VukO\vich, Civil Remedies in Bankruptcy for Corporate Fraud, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 439, 444-45 (1998) (observing that "state corporation laws and fraudulent conveyance law
generally protect creditor interests by prohibiting dividend payments that would render a corporation insolvent Furthermore, fraudulent transfer law and some states' corporation laws might offer
even greater protection.").
169. See text accompanying note 65 supra (observing that to make itself judgment proof,
Exxon would have to distribute its cash to its shareholders); White, supra note 10, at 1375 n.49
(acknowledging that "to judgment proof [a debtor] requires a second step, namely the disposition of
the net proceeds [of the judgment proofing transfer] by dividends to shareholders").
170. See White, supra note 10, at 1403-04 (arguing that "fraudulent conveyance law provides
a potential obstacle" to judgment proofing through subsidiaries).
171. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986).
172. This cost ordinarily would be much higher in an arm's length transaction than in a nonarm's length transaction. In the former, F2 would have no way to recover its loss; in the latter, the
cost would merely be a reallocation of assets \vithin a group of related companies.
173. Tabor, 803 F.2d at 1295.
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[borrower]."174 As a result, the court voided mortgages granted by the borrower to secure the loan.I15 In a judgment proofing transaction, a court
might apply similar reasoning: that the sale-leaseback between Fl and F2,
and Fl's subsequent payment of the sale proceeds to its shareholders, are
part of a single integrated transaction; that Fl therefore did not receive reasonably equivalent value for the assets sold to F2; and thus those assets must
be returned to Fl.
Fraudulent conveyance law does not, however, protect against the use of
structures in which Fl, the operating company, is undercapitalized at its
creation. Because there is no transfer of assets, fraudulent conveyance law
does not apply.I16 This problem can be illustrated by the hypothetical in
which Fl is established as an operating company with minimal assets, F2
acquires assets that F 1 wishes to use, and F2 leases those assets to F l.I17
This structure creates a risk of judgment proofing because Fl's operations
have the potential for generating liabilities that Fl, with its minimal owned
assets, would be unable to pay.I18
Nonetheless, another provision of bankruptcy law, which represents the
second way in which existing law regulates judgment proofing,179 not only
applies to undercapitalized related-company structures but also to any related-company structure.I 80 Assume that Fl, the operating company, is un174. [d. at 1302. Although the court's holding is technically limited to Pennsylvania's enactment of the Unifonn Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the court emphasized that Act's similarity to §
548 of the Bankruptcy Code. [d. at 1298-99.
175. See id. at 1305 (affinning the district court's ruling on this issue without commenting on
the borrower's obligation to repay the loan).
176. There would be an anomaly if the law restricted judgment proofing caused by asset
transfers but not judgment proofing resulting from related-company structures in which the operating company is undercapitalized at its creation. I later show that the anomaly does not exist because substantive consolidation law and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil protect against
the latter fonn ofjudgment proofing. See notes 175-179 and 194-196 infra and accompanying text
177. See notes 179-199 infra and accompanying text.
178. That risk would be minimized if FI's directors have an obligation to consider its potential future involuntary creditors. See notes 204-206 infra and accompanying text (discussing the
risk ofjudgment proofing if directors have no obligation to future involuntary creditors).
179. That is, regulation that imposes potential liability on parties participating in the judgment
proofing. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
180. In this context, Professor Bemie Black raises a related question-Why don't companies
simply operate with debt-heavy capital structures, which would soft judgment proof them as well as
provide large tax advantages?-and asks whether answering that question would help to explain
judgment proofing. He suggests three disincentives to debt-heavy capital structures: A debt-heavy
company (x) might find capital markets closed when it most needs them, (y) might motivate equity
holders to take risky gambles \vith creditor funds, to which creditors respond by not lending or by
insisting on covenants that strictly limit financial flexibility, and (z) is more likely to need financial
restructuring, to which creditors again respond by not lending. See electronic mail from Bernard
Black, Professor of Law, Stanford University School of Law, to Steven L. Schwarcz 2 (Mar. 7,
1999) (on file \vith author). These disincentives do not, however, address the motivation of F2 in
an ann's length judgment proofing; and a non-arm's length judgment proofing structure-in which,
for example, FI operates \vith a debt-heavy capital structure while its equity owner, F3, borrows for
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able to pay its creditors. Those creditors could force F1 into ban1cruptcylSl
and then could rely on the equitable power of a ban1cruptcy judge to order a
"substantive consolidation" of F1, F2, and even F3.l 82 A substantive consolidation "involves the pooling of the assets and liabilities of two or more
related entities; the liabilities of the entities involved are then satisfied from
the common pool of assets created by consolidation."183 Thus, the claims of
F1's creditors would be satisfied from F2's, and potentially also F3's, assets.l 84 In the latter case, Fl's creditors would have the right to claim against
all of F3's assets, not merely assets that F3 should have contributed as capital to Fl. F3 therefore could become significantly worse off than if it adequately capitalized F1 in the first place.
Substantive consolidation also has limited application to an arm's length
judgment proofing transaction. Although it would not apply to the transaction between the unrelated parties, F1 and F2, it could restrict F1's shareholders from participating in the judgment proofing, such as where F1 judgment proofs itself by distributing its assets to shareholders,18s or where
shareholders of an undercapitalized F1 induce F2 (such as by guaranteeing
the lease rentals) to lease assets to Fl. In either case, F l' s creditors could
seek to consolidate the assets of those shareholders, even if those shareholders are not themselves in bankruptcy.l86

Fl (or guaranties Fl's borrowing)-could avoid each of these disincentives. Professor Black's
question nonetheless is important. I attempt to address it in the larger context of analyzing judgment

proofing by undercapitalization, a debt-heavy capital structure being merely one way that a company could operate while undercapitalized.
181. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1993 & Supp. 1999) (discussing involuntary bankruptcy filings).
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1993) (stating that a bankruptcy judge has the power to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of' the Bankruptcy Code).
183. Eastgroup Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., 935 F.2d 245, 248 (11th Cir. 1991).
Even though F2 is not itself in bankruptcy, courts have ordered the substantive consolidation of
bankrupt and non-bankrupt entities. See, e.g., Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S.
215, 218-19 (1941) (consolidating the assets of a bankrupt corporation with those of its nonbankrupt shareholders); 5 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY '111100.06[1], at 110035 to 1100-37, '\11100.06[3], at 1100-49 to 1100-52 (15th ed. 1996).
184. Related companies also may become jointly liable through their own actions. Professor
White lists several cases where a parent company became directly liable for its subsidiary's liabilities, such as for defects in the parent's representation of a subsidiary's products or where the parent
owned and supplied defective machinery for use by its subsidiary. See White, supra note 10, at
1400 & n.139. White concludes, however, that "[b]ased upon the available evidence, it is impossible to tell how often a plaintiff can mount a plausible case against the parent" based on this approach. [d. at 1400; see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACf, AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 14 (1987 & Supp. 1999).
185. Substantive consolidation would not be a meaningful remedy, however, where Fl has so
many small shareholders that the burden of consolidating their estates is impractical.
186. See note 183 supra (arguing that shareholders themselves need not be in bankruptcy for
substantive consolidation to apply to them).
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Although substantive consolidation is discretionary with the judge, its
clearest application would be to judgment proofing. Indeed, there is a "liberal" trend toward using substantive consolidation to prevent hann caused by
"the widespread use of interrelated corporate structures."187 Courts balance
whether the "consolidation yields benefits offsetting the hann it inflicts on
objecting parties,"188 which are traditionally creditors of companies whose
assets are being consolidated-in our case, creditors of F2 (and, if applicable, also creditors of F3).l89 If an objecting creditor proves that it has relied
on the separate credit of F2 (or F3), a court will order consolidation only if
the benefits of consolidation heavily outweigh the hann.l90
In cases of judgment proofing, courts should especially favor consolidation in balancing benefits and harms. For example, the court in Eastgroup
Properties v. Southern Motel Assoc., Ltd.l 91 ordered substantive consolidation of a related-company structure that resembles the generic non-ann's
length structure we have been considering. Southern Motel Association
("SMA"), a company which can be viewed as the equivalent of F2 in our
hypothetical, owned or leased motel properties.l 92 It then leased or subleased
those properties to Gainesville P-H Properties ("GPH"), the equivalent of FI
in our hypothetical, whose only function was to operate the motel properties.l 93 SMA and GPH were under common ownership.l94 Because the
structure effectively judgment proofed GPH, its creditors "would not receive
anything" absent consolidation.l 9s The Eleventh Circuit, over the objection
of SMA's creditors, affirmed lower court decisions substantively consoli-

187. In re Murray Indus., Inc., 119 B.R. 820, 828 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
188. In re Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270,276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); accord Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at 249.
189. See Auto-Train Corp., 810 F.2d at 276 (discussing creditors that object to consolidation).
In order to reach this balancing test, the proponent of consolidation must show that there is substantial identity between the entities to be consolidated and that consolidation is necessary to avoid
some harm or to realize some benefit See Eastgroup Properties, 935 F.2d at 249. That should not
be difficult in the case of judgment proofing because the unity of interests and ownership between
various corporate entities, the existence of parent and intercorporate guarantees, and the fact that,
absent consolidation, FI's creditors will receive only a small portion of their claims while F2 and
its shareholders receive a substantial distribution are factors from which a court may conclude that
substantive consolidation is warranted. See id. at 249-50.
190. See Auto-Train, 810 F.2d at 276 (discussing creditors that rely on the separate credit of
an entity). But see In re Augie!Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying
consolidation where one creditor would suffer unfairly).
191. 935 F.2d 245 (11th Cir. 1991).
192. See id. at 246.
193. Seeid.
194. See id. at 247.
195. Id. at 248.
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dating SMA and GPH, even though "each held itself out to the public and to
its creditors as a separate corporation."196
Even outside of a bankruptcy context, courts sometimes use their inherent equitable powers in appropriate cases to "pierce the corporate veil" of a
related-company structure.197 If that occurred, it would impose costs on the
parties-F2 and F3 in our example-participating in the judgment proofing.
For example, where a parent company acquired a subsidiary, cancelled its
liability insurance, and drained the subsidiary of assets in order to thwart the
claim of a tort creditor, a court allowed the creditor to claim directly against
the parent. 198 Professor White observes that "[a]lthough the tests for veil
piercing are hardly precise, their factors coincide more or less with the acts a
parent would have to take to insulate itself from liability generated by a subsidiary. "199
196. Id. The issue of whether the common owners, represented by F3 in our hypothetical,
also should be consolidated apparently was not raised by the parties. Nonetheless, shareholders are
subject to substantive consolidation. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215,
218 (1941) (consolidating the assets ofa corporation with those of its shareholders).
197. Piercing the corporate veil and substantive consolidation are sinIi1ar to the extent that
both allow a corporation's assets to be reached for the satisfaction of a related company's debt. See
In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 517 F.2d 997, 1000 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting the similarity
between piercing the corporate veil and consolidation).
198. See Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs., 853 F.2d 772, 780 (lOth Cir. 1988). Professors Easterbrook and Fischel suggest an economic rationale for piercing the corporate veil in a parent-subsidiary context:
If limited liability is absolute, a parent can form a subsidiary with minimal capitalization for
the purpose of engaging in risky activities. If things go weIl, the parent captures the benefits.
If things go poorly, the subsidiary declares banIcruptcy, and the parent creates another with the
same managers to engage in the same activities. This asymmetry between the benefits and
costs, if limited liability were absolute, would create incentives to engage in a sociaIly excessive amount of risky activities.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 57.
199. White, supra note 10, at 1401-02. Those factors include common directors and officers;
consolidated financial statements; the parent's financing of the subsidiary, arranging its incorporation, and paying its salaries and other expenses; undercapitalization of the subsidiary; and the subsidiary's acting as the parent's alter ego. See United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686,
691-92 (5th Cir. 1985). Some commentators focus on undercapitalization: "The data ... suggests
[sic] that although undercapitalization is not a guarantee of plaintiff success [in a veil piercing case],
it comes reasonably close." WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 199 (7th ed. 1995). Asset stripping which causes undercapitalization appears to be widely accepted as a requisite act justifying veil piercing. See, e.g., Kvassay v. Murray,
808 P.2d 896, 905-06 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991) (piercing the corporate veil for asset stripping). Furthermore, commentators have observed that "[t]he legal doctrine of piercing the veil is so amorphous that it leaves a large area in which courts can impose liability based upon a 'smell' test of
fairness." Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1,23 (1994); see also Mark
A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form-Should the Corporate Veil Be Pierced?, 64 UMKCL. REv. 311, 318
(1995) (noting that "under certain circumstances, a court may find that the conduct was simply
'unjust' or 'inequitable'" to satisfy the wrongful conduct factor). One such commentator, for example, argues that "most decisions to pierce find their real justification in wrongs committed by the
defendant in his or her dealings with the plaintiff or abusive dealings ... with the corporation's
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Corporation law also may restrict judgment proofing.200 The traditional
duty of a corporation's managers, its board of directors, is to the corporation's shareholders/O! suggesting that the board would favor payment of
dividends to shareholders at the expense of involuntary creditors. Nonetheless, the directors of an insolvent corporation appear to have a duty to creditors as well,202 and that duty might apply even absent actual insolvency.
assets." Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine ofPiercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 854 (1997).
200. In addition 10 the corporate governance restrictions that I will discuss, "[e]very state
statutorily restricts the directors' authority to make dividend distnbutions based on the corporation's financial condition." Cox ET AL., supra note 59, § 20.12, at 20.31. A typical requirement is
that dividends be payable solely out of the company's surplus or net profits. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (1998). This type oflirnitation, however, may not restrict judgment proofing
against future involuntary credilOrs. Delaware law defines surplus as the "excess, if any, at any
given time, of the net assets of the corporation over the amount so determined [by resolution of its
board of directors] to be capital," but future claims are not deducted from net assets. Id. § 154.
Furthermore, the board can determine that only a part of the consideration received for issuance of
stock ,vill be capital. See id. Therefore, prior to incurring claims, a Delaware corporation will be
able to pay substantially all of its assets as dividends. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties ofthe
Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L. REv. 505, 557-58 (1977) (arguing that "it is possible for tort credilOrs of a corporation to be adversely affected by the weak dividend restraints of
ordinary business corporation law. At the time a tort claim arises, the corporation's net worth ...
may have fallen so low because of past dividend payments that the tort creditor's claim will not be
satisfied to any significant degree" (citations omitted». Some states require that a "certain ratio of
certain assets to current liabilities, or assets to liabilities, such as 1Y. to 1, ... be left after a distribution of dividends in order to avoid impairment of debt-paying ability and working capital position." COx ET AL., supra note 59, § 20.12, at 20.31 (citing this as an alternative approach used in
California). And the Revised Model Business Corporation Act proposes an "equity insolvency test"
under which directors must reasonably expect that known obligations will be satisfied over the
period of time that they mature. REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 6.40 cmt.2 (1984) (noting that
directors may not simply compare current assets to current liabilities). These requirements, however, may not significantly affect judgment proofing because corporations can choose where to
incorporate. See Cox ET AL, supra note 59, § 3.2, at 3.4 to 3.5 ("In selecting the state of incorporation, the attorney makes a decision ... as to the relevant statutory law .... As such, it may be
advisable to shop for the jurisdiction that will best suit the organizers' needs."). A corporation that
,vishes to judgment proof itself thus could reincorporate (or, ifnew, incorporate itself) in a state that
does not impose these requirements. See id. at 3.7 (observing that "[i]t is not unusual today for a
corporation to change its domicile through reincorporation").
201. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)
(stating that "directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders"). There are certain other limited duties arising out of contract or commercial law, but they are
not relevant here because of my focus on involuntary creditors who neither have contractual covenants nor engage in commercial transactions with the company. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
Rethinl..ing a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 647 (1996) (arguing
that a corporate debtor has a commercial law obligation of good faith to abide by courses of dealing
and is bound according to explicit contractual obligations, such as covenants) [hereinafter Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations].
202. See Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A.2d 784,790 (Del. Ch. 1992) (stating that
directors of insolvent corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors); see also Cox ET AL, supra
note 59, § 10.18, at 10.61-.63 (discussing the contours of this duty); Rethinking a Corporation's
Obligations, supra note 201, at 666-68 & n.l 00 (citing cases to support the argument that "creditors
[of an insolvent corporation] become the primary residual claimants," and therefore "[t]he fiduciary
obligation that directors previously owed only to shareholders as owners of the corporation [should]
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Where a corporation is in the "vicinity of insolvency," the Delaware Chancery Court has held that directors owe an obligation to both creditors and
shareholders.203 I have argued that directors also should have an obligation
to creditors where the company's actions have a reasonable expectation of
resulting in insolvency.204 Directors who judgment-proof a corporation by
distributing assets to its shareholders therefore may be violating their fiduciary obligation to the company's creditors because inability to pay future
debts is a form ofinsolvency.205 Thus, corporate governance law may limit a
company's ability to judgment-proofitself.206
There are, additionally, two tort theories207-lender liability and prima
facie tort-under which F2, if it helps to judgment-proof Fl, may become
directly liable to Fl's creditors.20B Under lender liability law, creditors that
breach a duty of good faith or fair dealing may become liable not only for

also extend to creditors, whose rights have been transfonned by insolvency into equity-type
rights'').
203. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
Civ.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
204. See Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations, supra note 201, at 672-78 (arguing that a
"contingent insolvency" approach "sets a brighter line than Chancellor Allen's approach [in the
Credit Lyonnais case] to detennine when directors have loyalty to creditors as weIl as shareholders,
but gives more leeway and discretion to directors when that dual loyalty arises").
205. At least under Delaware corporation law, insolvency includes a company's being "unable to pay its debts as they faIl due in the usual course of business." Geyer, 621 A.2d at 789.
206. To the extent that the case-law corporate governance restrictions discussed above are not
applied in all jurisdictions, those restrictions may not significantly affect judgment proofing because
corporations can choose where to incorporate. Cf note 200 supra (discussing same in the context
of state statutory restrictions on the payment of dividends). That choice wiII detennine "the case
law that wiIl govern all corporate questions, including the duties of the corporation's officers and
directors." Cox ET AL., supra note 59, § 3.2, at 3.4. There are, however, several differences between these case law and statutory restrictions that may make the fonner more applicable to judgment proofing. The development of the relevant case law is being led by courts in Delaware, the
jurisdiction that heavily dominates the incorporation of American businesses. See ROBERT W.
HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 172-75 (6th ed. 1998) (noting that Delaware is the preferred state of incorporation for publicly held corporations). Delaware is one of the
more permissive states for incorporation, see Cox ET AL., supra note 59, § 3.2, at 3.6 (observing
that the state "has generaIly been regarded as a permissive haven"), suggesting that restrictions in
Delaware are more likely to be adopted in less permissive jurisdictions. Finally, "the Delaware
jUdiciary is highly regarded today" and "decisions [of the Delaware Supreme Court] are often followed by courts in other states." HAMILTON, supra, at 175 (observing that even the Delaware
Chancery Court "is the envy of other states").
207. For an analysis of the deterrent value of tort law, see generaIly Gary T. Schwartz, Reality
in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994)
(concluding, at 443, that although tort law does not "systematically" deter, it does provide "something significant by way of deterrence"). The possibility of punitive damages in the case of lender
liability, see notes 208-213 infra and accompanying text, may provide even greater deterrence.
208. I later explain why lender liability law, which imposes liability on creditors, would give
rise to F2's liability to creditors in a judgment proofing transaction. See note 220 infra and accompanying text
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hann caused to the debtor but also for punitive damages.209 For example, in
K.MC. Co. v. Irving Trust CO.,210 a bank which refused to lend $800,000 to a
borrower was held liable, even though the bank had no contractual obligation
to lend.211 The court held that the bank's sudden refusal to continue lending
to the borrower, which had no other source of funds, was not in good faith
given the bank's past practice of lending money upon request; the bank at
least should have given the borrower notice and a reasonable opportunity to
arrange for alternate financing. 212 The court upheld a jury award of $7.5
million-the amount of K.M.C.'s damages-against the bank, notwithstanding the award's being almost ten times the size of the refused 10an.213
The same tort theory that underlies lender liability law-that creditors
may be violating a duty of fair dealing they owe to their debtor214-could be
applied to judgment proofing. The duty of fair dealing that a lender owes to
its debtor neither arises out of contract21S nor rises to a fiduciary level.2 16
Rather, the duty is based on an implied obligation to exercise good faith in
commercial transactions, inspired by the good faith duty under the Uniform

209. See Frances E. Freund, Susan D. Gresham, Robert D. Rowe & N. Sue Van Sant Palmer,
Special Project, Lender Liability: A Survey o/Common-Law Theories, 42 VAND. L. REv. 855, 85758 (1989) (noting lhe "multimillion dollar punitive damages available under a tort lheory"); see
also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (imposing
punitive damages in a lender liability case).
210. 757 F.2d 752 (6lh Cir. 1986).
211. The bank provided an uncommitted line of credit for up to $3.5 million. The particular
loan in question, however, was only $800,000. See id. at 754.
212. See id. at 761-63. The court also appeared concerned lhat a personality dispute between
a representative oflhe bank and an officer oflhe borrower led to lhe refusal to lend. See id. at 761.
213. See id. at 766.
214. See Freund et aI., supra note 209, at 883-84 (discussing tort actions against lenders for
bad failh); Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual
Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 795-98 (1986) (discussing lhe duty of good failh and fair dealing lhat
underlies lender liability cases). Lender liability cases sometimes are based on olher lheories, including breach of contract, fraud, duress, interference, and negligence. See Freund et aI., supra note
209, at 855-85 (discussing lhese lheories).
215. The lender liability duty of good failh is "imposed by law." See Freund et aI., supra note
209, at 884-85. It also may be imposed by contract, but a contract is not necessary for lhe duty to
arise. See id. Indeed, Easterbrook and Fischel argue lhat courts are more willing to pierce lhe corporate veil and impose liability in tort cases lhan in contract cases because contract creditors are
compensated for lhe increased credit risk while tort creditors are not. See EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 58. But see Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An
Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036, 1058 (1991) (discussing empirical data showing lhat
courts have pierced lhe veil more often in contract lhan tort cases).
216. A debtor-creditor relationship is not generally fiduciary. See, e.g., In re Ludwig Honold
Mfg. Co., 46 B.R. 125, 128 (Bankr. B.D. Pa. 1985) (observing lhat creditors generally have no
fiduciary obligations to debtors); In re Teltronics Servs., Inc., 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 762 F.2d 185 (2d Cir. 1985) (same). But see A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
309 N.W.2d 285, 293 (Minn. 1981) (imposing lender liability based on lhe special relationship
between lhe lender and lhe borrower).
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Commercial Code.217 Thus, the parties need not be in a contractual or fiduciary relationship for lender liability to be imposed.
By helping to make F 1 judgment proof in order to gain an advantage at
the expense of Fl's creditors, F2 may well be violating an implied obligation
of good faith to those creditors.21s Courts are not reluctant to extend lender
liability to further their own sense of justice.219 Thus, F2 could be held liable
to Fl's creditors on a lender liability theory.220
The extension of lender liability to judgment proofing also makes economic sense. It has been argued that the common law rationale for piercing
the corporate veil
may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance the benefits of limited liability against its costs. Courts are more likely to allow creditors to reach
the assets of shareholders where limited liability provides minimal gains from
improved liquidity and diversification [of investor risk in the corporation],
while creating a high probability that a firm will engage in a socially excessive
level of risk taking.221

This same rationale is applicable to arm's length judgment proofing transactions that are not subject to veil piercing. Judgment proofing provides minimal gains from improved liquidity and diversification but creates a high
probability that Fl will engage in a socially excessive level of risk taking.

217. The Uniform Commercial Code, or U.C.C., provides that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1203 (1989). Although the U.C.C. does not technically apply either to debtor-creditor or judgment
proofing transactions, some courts have imputed a duty of good faith in all commercial transactions,
even to those outside the purview of the U.C.C. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Service Bus. Forms Indus.,
Inc., 882 F.2d 1538, 1540-42 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757
F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985) (comparing U.C.C. good faith principles to a non-U.C.C. situation
and inferring a good faith duty as the basis for lender liability); Noonan v. First Bank Butte, 740 P.
2d 631, 634 (Mont. 1987) (applying § 1-203 to a debtor-creditor context); First Nat'l Bank in Libby
v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Mont. 1984) (finding that bank breached its obligation to act in
good faith); see also Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty and Beyond, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 1237, 1241
(1989) (observing that even where the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply directly, courts
have had little theoretical difficulty imposing upon lenders an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing).
218. If F2 demands extraordinary compensation to offset the risk of having a judgment proof
lessee, it could not even argue that its sale-leaseback transaction with FI has independent business
justification.
219. See William M. Burke, Tom Thomas & William D. Warren, Emerging Theories ofBank
Liability, in BANKS AND THEIR BORROWERS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 403,
458 (1984) (observing that the use of fair dealing to impose lender liability is a "loose cannon
[which] may be used by courts to further their views ofjustice").
220. Although different parties are involved in lender liability than in judgment proofing, that
distinction appears formalistic. In both situations, the parties may be seen to be dealing unfairly in
order to take advantage of third parties-to recover their claims in the case oflender liability, and to
obtain compensation in the case ofjudgment proofing.
221. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 55.
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Accordingly, if F2 helps to judgment-proof Fl, courts should be more likely
to allow Fl's creditors to reach F2's assets.
A court that wishes to punish the parties involved in a judgment proofing
also might resort to the shadowy doctrine of prima facie tort.222 Described
by some courts as a "misty shroud,"223 the doctrine has been adopted in "the
overwhelming majority" of states that have considered it.224 The doctrine
provides that "[o]ne who intentionally causes injury to another is subject to
liability to the other for that injury, if his conduct is generally culpable and
not justifiable under the circumstances. This liability may be imposed although the actor's conduct does not come ,vithin a traditional category oftort
liability."22s The element of intent to injure is satisfied in most jurisdictions
when the defendant "knows or believes that the consequence is certain, or
substantially certain, to result from his act," irrespective of whether the defendant wishes to cause injury.226 Furthermore, the element of lack of justification appears to focus less on whether there is a valid business reason,
such as compensation or shareholder benefit, and more on whether the conduct is "in accord ,vith community standards of right conduct."227 Hence, F2
or F3 might be held liable to Fl's creditors on the theory that they knew or
believed that those creditors would be substantially certain not to recover
their claims from a judgment proof Fl, and that F2 and F3's conduct-aiding and abetting a judgment proofing-is not in accord ,vith community
standards of right conduct.
Finally, the officers and directors of Fl, F2, and F3 (as well as F2 and
F3 in their corporate capacities) might be subject to RICO, which would allow injured persons (Fl's creditors) to recover treble damages and the costs
of their lawsuits228 and also would impose criminalliability.229
RICO imposes liability on persons associated ,vith an "enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce who conduct the affairs of that enterprise
222. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modem Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 79 Ky. L.J. 519,
555 (1991) (obseIVing that "[p]rima facie tort, in the final analysis, merely embodies in doctrinal
form the fluidity of tort law").
223. [d. at519 &n.1.
224. [d. at 525.
225. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979).
226. [d. at cmt b; see also Vandevelde, supra note 222, at 529 (stating that the element of intent requires "only that the defendant have acted with substantial certainty that injury would occur"). However, New York, the jurisdiction with the most experience litigating prima facie tort,
restricts its application to situations in which the defendant is motivated "solely by malice." [d. at
540 & D.128 (citing New York cases to that effect).
227. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870, cmt e.
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994). RICO itself may not be applied without an underlying predicate criminal activity, for which there would be separate criminal liability. I later discuss, however,
the practical reasons why RICO liability may be a much greater deterrent to judgment proofing.
See notes 235-248 infra and accompanying text
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"through a pattern of racketeering activity."230 The parties involved in judgment proofing Fl arguably would constitute an "enterprise," which is
broadly defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity."231 For RICO to apply, the enterprise also must
conduct its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The predicate
criminal acts that establish racketeering activity are specifically set forth in
RICO.232 In the context of judgment proofing, these acts arguably could include bankruptcy fraud,233 fmancial institution fraud,234 or perhaps even mail
fraud or wire fraud. 23s
Before examining these predicate acts, I will put them into perspective.
RICO may not be applied to judgment proofing without a predicate criminal
act, so a judgment proofmg that causes such an act would be criminal already. What, then, does RICO add to the crime? There are three answers.
First, the types of predicate acts that result from judgment proofing in many
ways resemble ordinary commercial transactions, and it may be difficult to
prove criminal intent. Prosecutors therefore may be reluctant to bring criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, "[e]ven if it is more likely than not that the
activity is not criminal, or that no prosecutor would ever bring a case ... ,
RICO might become relevant, as it has in most of the civil RICO suits that
have been brought, because private plaintiffs [such as injured creditors] are
likely to take a more aggressive view of the content of the criminal law than
prosecutors will."236 Second, in a civil RICO case, plaintiffs need only prove
230. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994). For an excellent discussion of the origins and history of
RICO, see Gerard E. Lynch, A Conceptual, Practical, and Political Guide to RICO Reform, 43
VANO. L. REv. 769, 770-76 (1990).
231. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994). The definition is so broad that it might even include shareholders of an undercapitalized F 1 who guaranty rentals on leased assets.
232. Those predicate acts are specified in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994), the definition of "racketeering activity." Bad acts that are not so specified do not qualifY. See Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F.
Supp. 1316, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
233. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1994), which provides that "any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11 [the Bankruptcy Code] ... punishable under any law of the
United States" is a predicate act under RICO. Although it is doubtful whether a fraudulent conveyance that is merely voidable under 11 U.S.C. § 548 would constitute such a predicate act, it seems
clear that a bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 152 would constitute a predicate act, because such
frauds are punishable by up to five years imprisonment; see DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF
CIvIL RICO § 5.3.4, at 283-85 (1991 & 1998 Supp.) (observing that "[t]he bankruptcy fraud predicate [of RICO] would include at least violations of 18 U.S.C. § 152").
234. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994), which provides that financial institution fraud is a
predicate act under RICO to the extent it is indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
235. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994) provides that mail fraud and wire fraud are predicate acts
under RICO to the extent those instances of fraud are indictable under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 or § 1343,
respectively.
236. Letter from Gerard E. Lynch, Professor, Columbia Law School, to the author (Dec. 21,
1998) (on file with author). Professor Lynch explains that "[p]rosecutors will shy away from
bringing [a contract fraud case] because it 'looks like' a civil rather than criminal matter, and be-
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the occurrence of predicate acts ''by the usual preponderance of the evidence
[civil] standard."237 Finally, the enterprise liability approach of RICO may
extend liability to parties who would not be subject to liability for the predicate act under non-RICO law.
There should be little problem finding one or more criminal predicate
acts in a judgment proofing transaction. Bankruptcy fraud, for example, applies to "an agent or officer of any ... corporation [that], in contemplation of
a case under title 11 by or against ... any ... corporation, or with intent to
defeat the provisions of title 11, lmowingly and fraudulently transfers or conceals any of ... the property of such ... corporation."238 Officers and directors of Fl may be engaging in such fraud even if, at the time of the judgment proofing, bankruptcy is only a distantly contemplated possibility.239
From that predicate act, RICO would impose enterprise liability on F2 and
F3, and their officers and directors, to the extent they participate in the
fraud.240
Judgment proofing also might constitute fmancial institution fraud,
which applies whenever a person "lmowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice ... to defraud a financial institution."241 The term

cause the proof of intention is difficult given the criminal burden of proof. But private civil plaintiffs find it easy to bring the civil suit, and to make the allegation in good faith that the [party
breaching the contract] had criminal intent" [d. at 2. Thus, "RICO creates an opportunity for
claims offiaud or criminality to be made in situations where prosecutors would fear to tread...."
[d. at3.
237. ABRAMS, supra note 233, § 5.3, at 265.
238. 18 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1994). For a recent overview of bankruptcy fraud, see Symposium,
Bankruptcy Fraud, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 271 (1998). As part of that symposium, an Assistant United States Trustee observes that "prosecutions [for bankruptcy fraud] have increased
across the country for a couple of reasons." Roundtable Discussion Comments of Sandra Rasnak,
id. at 277 (giving as reasons the better working relationships between bankruptcy court officers and
federal criminal investigative agencies and Attorney General Janet Reno's priority focus on bankruptcy fraud).
239. See United States v. West, 22 F.3d 586, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1994). The one year limitation
of bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance law under 11 U.S.C. § 548 is not applicable to 18 U.S.C. §
152, which applies to "transfers of property occurring more than one year prior to the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy" if its statutozy requirements are otherwise met West, 22 F.3d at 590.
240. See notes 230-231 supra and accompanying text (explaining enterprise liability). Alternatively, those parties would be liable under aiding and abetting and conspiracy theories. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994) (making it "unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of' RICO); United States. v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (upholding RICO
conviction based, inter alia, on defendant's predicate offense of conspiracy).
241. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). Courts have interpreted "financial institution" to mean one
that is federally chartered or insured. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 93 (2d Cir.
1997) ("Consequently, 'a conviction under the "scheme to defraud" clause of the bank fraud statute
requires ... a pattern or course of conduct designed to deceive a federally chartered or insured financial institution into releasing property, with the intent to victimize the institution by exposing it
to actual or potential loss.'" (quoting United States v. Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 694 (2d Cir.
1992))).
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"scheme to defraud" is broadly construed to include any plan or pattem242
that departs from "fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and
candid dealings."243 Furthermore, courts have upheld financial institution
fraud as a predicate act for application of RICO even where the financial institution in question was not the actual or intended victim of the scheme to
defraud but merely was exposed to risk of loss on its claim for repayment.244
To the extent judgment proofing exposes a financial institution creditor of FI
to a risk of loss on its claim for repayment, financial institution fraud would
appear to be a predicate crime for the application ofRICO.24s
Because RICO already has been applied in a wide range of commercial
cases,246 creditors injured in a judgment proofing are likely to claim a RICO
violation.247 Despite protests that RICO's application has exceeded the
original statutory intent, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to narrow
its scope,248 noting that RICO provides that its provisions are to be "liberally
242. See United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 624 (3d Cir. 1987) (defining the term
"scheme" to include any plan or pattern).
243. See United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1992) (affirming that a
"scheme to defraud" may include any scheme that departs from "fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fair play and candid dealings in the general life of the community" (quoting Goldblatt,
813 F.2d at 624»; see also United States v. Norton, 909 F. Supp. 567, 568 (N.D. Dl. 1995), affd,
108 F.3d 133 (7th Cir. 1997) (same). Thus, evidence of pledging the same item of collateral for
separate loans is sufficient to establish a scheme to defraud. See United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d
595, 601 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that double-pledging "at least one item of collateral" was evidence of violating "fundamental honesty, moral uprightness, or fairplay and candid dealings").
244. See Stiller v. Sumter Bank & Trust Co., 860 F. Supp. 835, 839 (M.D. Ga. 1994) ("As
long as the bank is exposed to the risk of loss by some scheme or artifice, the statute has been violated." (citing United States v. Briggs, 965 F.2d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1992»).
245. Although not as explicitly applicable to judgment proofing, mail and wire fraud also
might constitute predicate acts in appropriate cases for the application of RICO. See Lynch, supra
note 230, at 795 ("An aggrieved party can describe most kinds of commercial dispute as some species of fraud, and, therefore, given the Ubiquity of themailsandinterstatewirecommunications.as
mail or wire fraud.").
246. See. e.g., United States v. Porcelli, 865 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1989) (tax evasion); United
States v. Regan, 726 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1991) (securities fraud); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868
F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989) (abortion protestors); cf Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1055
(S.D. Cal. 1984) (observing that a broad reading of RICO "would literally make a federal case out
of nearly every instance of business fraud"); Lynch, supra note 230, at 794 (noting that allegations
of business or securities fraud, regarded by many as '''garden variety commercial disputes,' comprise nearly three-quarters of all reported RICO cases"); E.F. Mannino, Lender Liability and Banking Litigation § 4.02 (1989) (citing a variety of civil RICO actions involving financial institutions).
247. Indeed Edward Mannino, speaking at a law school symposium on RICO, observed that
"it may now be malpractice not to include a RICO count in a civil complaint in commerciallitigation." Anne B. Poulin, RICO: Somethingfor Everyone, 35 VILL. L. REv. 853, 857 (1990); see also
Absence ofRICO Claim in Securities Suits Termed "Malpractice" by Attorney, 16 Sees. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 754 (May 4, 1984) (reporting the similar remarks of attorney Jerold S.
Solovy).
248. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Irnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985) ("RICO is to be read
broadly."); Poulin, supra note 247, at 860 (noting that Congress has steadfastly refused to significantly narrow RICO's scope).
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construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."249 Irrespective of whether a
RICO claim ultimately will be successful,250 its "mobster" stigma and the
fact that the claim may be asserted against individual officers and directors is
likely to have a significant deterrent effect.
Judgment proofing therefore is regulated by laws that not only restrict a
company's ability to judgment-proof itself but also may impose costs on the
parties participating in the judgment proofing transaction.2St Those costs
may even include punitive damages, treble damages, and criminal liability.
Moreover, where existing legal doctrines do not clearly cover judgment
proofing, it is but a short step conceptually to apply those doctrines to it.252
There still remains an issue, however, of whether the costs of judgment
proofing ,vill be significantly discounted, given the uncertainty of their infliction. I next show that, at least in an arm's length context, they will not.
Irrespective of the ex ante probability that costs ,vill be incurred, the
consequences could be devastating. Just how the parties view these potential
costs ,vill be somewhat different in arm's length and non-arm's length transactions. As I have already shown, F2 will be risk averse in an arm's length
transaction253 and therefore will be more likely to view the costs as reasonably serious possibilities that would, in turn, be irrational to discount: "[i]n
evaluating risks, risk-averse persons tend to assign too much weight to
events that have a low probability of occurrence, when the consequences of

249. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat 947.
250. For example, the application of RICO to a parent-subsidiary structure might be questioned because courts are split as to whether a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are capable of
conspiring with each other. See ABRAMS, supra note 233, § 4.8, at 250-51.
251. Laws may impose costs in other ways, such as by setting minimum insurance requirements. For example, Professor White argues that "[m]easured by the number of potential claims,
workers' compensation may be the single largest barrier to judgment proofing." White, supra note
10, at 1409. Workers' compensation, however, is only a barrier to a company's ability to judgment
proof itself against claims of its employees who are injured in the course of their employment
252. The history of the common law is full of examples of courts extending existing legal
doctrines to remedy injustices: "[T]he common law is not static; its life and heart is its dynamism-its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly searching for just and fair solutions
to pressing societal problems." Harrison v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 456 A.2d 894, 903
(Md. 1983). Thus, in Schmoll v. Acands, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988), affd, 977 F.2d 499
(9th Cir. 1992), a corporation being subjected to massive asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits
restructured itself through "an elaborate, apparently unique transfer of corporate assets," id. at 872,
that was "designed to [enable it to] escape liability," id. at 873. Even though "the corporate restructuring [met] the technical formalities of corporate form," the court held the transferee of the
assets liable for the transferring corporation's claims. Id. at 874. The court's rationale was that the
transfer "was designed with the improper purpose of escaping asbestos-related liabilities," id. at
874, and "[u]pholding the integrity of such transactions would unjustly elevate form over substance," id. at 875. (The court also could have voided the transfer under fraudulent conveyance
law, but apparently the plaintiffpreferred to impose successor liability on the transferee. See id. at
874n.11).
253. See note 138 supra and accompanying text (arguing thatF2 will be risk averse because it
is engaging in a task for gain, in the form of compensation).
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such events are extremely adverse."2s4 F2 therefore would want to avoid
judgment proofing in order to avoid these costs.2SS
However, the parties are more likely to discount these costs in a nonarm's length transaction. We are most concerned with the perception of F3,
the common owner of Fl and F2. In a non-arm's length transaction, F3 cannot know ex ante whether the costs of judgment proofing will exceed its
benefits. F3 also may be risk prone. Thus, F3 is more likely to discount
these costs as unrealistic.
These ambiguities make it difficult for economic analysis alone to predict the extent to which non-arm's length judgment proofing will occur or to
answer the broader question of whether non-arm's length judgment proofing
is adequately regulated by law. Nevertheless, by examining empirical evidence, I next argue that the rate of non-arm's length judgment proofing is
unlikely to increase in the future.

E. Is Non-Arm's Length Judgment Proofing Adequately Regulated by Law?
Non-arm's length judgment proofing would occur where its benefit, ~,
exceeds its costs to related companies Fl, F2, and F3. Although economic
analysis alone cannot predict the precise relationship between ~ and those
costs, empirical evidence reveals that the relationship will be stable over
time.
Professor White has compiled fifteen years of empirical data on American companies that may be relevant.2s6 He shows that the ratio of assets to
liabilities has remained constant, from which he concludes that companies
remain adequately capitalized.2s7 He also shows that the amount of secured
debt as a percentage of assets appears to be declining, suggesting that companies are not increasing their use of secured debt strategies for judgment
proofing.2s8 Finally, he shows that although buying liability insurance is inconsistent with judgment proofmg, the data indicate no significant diminution in the level ofliability insurance outstanding.2S9

254. See Alexander, supra note 107, at 531.
255. Cf. Christina L. Kunz, Frontispiece on Good Faith: A Functional Approach Within the
UCC, 16 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 1105, 1110 (1990) (arguing that some uncertainty in the law can
increase sociaIIy desirable behavior by motivating parties to act within the range of clearly acceptable behavior).
256. See White, supra note 10, at 1369-93. His data cover the period 1981-1995. See id. at
1371 n.42.
257. See id. at 1374-80.
258. See id. at 1371-74. Recall that LoPucki concludes that secured debt strategies are "so
deep-rooted in culture that they are virtuaIIy impossible to change." Death ofLiability, supra note
1, at 4.
259. See White, supra note 10, at 1380-88.
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White's data do not, however, reveal the relative relationship between 11
and the cost of judgment proofing because they do not show whether judgment proofing exists at all and, if so, at what leve1.26o Nonetheless, the data
do indicate that the ratio of 11 to such cost is not increasing-for if that ratio
were increasing, the level of judgment proofing similarly would be expected
to rise. Therefore, if the current level of judgment proofing is socially acceptable, Professor White's data predict that judgment proofing will continue
at a socially acceptable level and will not, as claimed, rise to a level that undermines the system by which money judgments are enforced.261
White cautions that his "data do not foreclose the possibility that Professor LoPucki's claims [that American businesses are rendering themselves
judgment proof] will turn out to be correct in the future."262 But the following analysis suggests that White's caution goes too far.
Non-arm's length judgment proofing has been around for centuries.263
Therefore there is little reason to believe-and certainly none has been ad260. By "relative relationship," I mean which is greater: D. or the cost ofjudgment proofing.
261. White's data are not, however, conclusive on this point His analysis of corporate secured debt as a percentage of assets does not take into account what may be the most common form
of secured debt-non-recourse debt-which does not generally appear on a company balance sheet
and therefore would not be included in the data examined by Professor White. See Easy Case,
supra note 15, at 462-65. One therefore cannot know from such data whether overall secured debt,
as a percentage of assets, is increasing or decreasing. His analysis of corporate assets-to-liabilities
ignores that companies, which generally prefer lower asset-to-liability ratios, could manipulate that
ratio. For example, a company that incurs non-recourse as opposed to ordinary debt would not
affect that ratio because non-recourse debt does not generally appear on a company balance sheet
See, e.g., SECURITIZATION, supra note 21, at 2 (showing the impact of non-recourse debt on a company's financial ratios and explaining how a company could lower its asset-to-liability ratio by
using the proceeds of non-recourse debt to repay liabilities). Finally, White's analysis of changes in
outstanding liability insurance between 1982 and 1995 does not necessarily overcome the response
that even judgment proof companies will buy liability insurance so long as the cost of insurance is
less than the cost of bankruptcy. See Death ojLiability, supra note 1, at 76.
262. White, supra note 10, at 1394.
263. See id. at 1364 ("Taking secret security, making fraudulent conveyances, operating with
insufficient capital, and distributing one's assets to shareholders in preference to creditors have been
practiced for hundreds of years ...."). Non-arm's length judgment proofing has even been satirized by Gilbert and Sullivan in the last century:
Some seven men form an Association,
(If possible, all Peers and Baronets)
They start off with a public declaration
To what extent they mean to pay their debts.
That's call'd their Capital: if they are wary
They will not quote it at a sum immense.
The figure's immaterial-it may vary
From eighteen million down to eighteen pence.
I should put it rather low;
The good sense of doing so
Will be evident at once to any debtor.
If you succeed, your profits are stupendousAnd if you fail, pop goes your eighteen pence.
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vanced to suggest-that non-ann's length judgment proofing will be more
innovative in the future than has been attempted in the past.264 Both the parent-subsidiary ownership strategy as well as the more generic non-ann's
length structure referred to in this article are merely examples of the ancient
technique of "distributing one's assets to shareholders in preference to
creditors."26s These structures have been well-known and widely used for
decades, and there is nothing to hint that business innovations or new technologies are likely to make them more prevalent.266 Even the possibility that
mass tort claims will increase in the future would not necessarily increase d,
because d is limited by the value of Fl's interest in its assets.267 To the contrary, an increase in Fl's tort claims actually could deter judgment proofing
because the liability of F2 and F3 is not limited by the amount of Fl's assets.268 Thus White's empirical data at least should be persuasive evidence
that the level of non-ann's length judgment proofing will not increase.269 If

If you come to grief, and creditors are craving
You merely file a Winding-Up Petition,
And start another Company at once!
W.S. GILBERT, UTOPIA LIMITED; OR, THE FLOWERS OF PROGRESS, Act I, Finale, No. lIe (1893)
(satirizing judgment proofing by undercapitalization).
264. Professor LoPucki claims, however, that computerization will make the logistics of
judgment proofing easier and cheaper by helping to keep track of assets transferred among members
of a corporate group and lowering the transaction costs of maintaining elaborate corporate structures. In Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 52 STAN. L. REv. 77 (1999), I show that claim is irrelevant Non-arm's length strategies, which are merely examples of the ancient strategy of distributing
one's assets to shareholders in preference to creditors, will not be changed by computerization.
Computerization also cannot reduce legal liabilities, which provide the real deterrent to judgment
proofing. In any event, because I assign no costs to the types oflogistical factors that computerization can facilitate, my analysis already implicitly assumes computerization.
265. White, supra note 10, at 1364. The use of SPVs in securitization transactions also has
been common for decades. See SECURITIZATION, supra note 21, at 3-4 (examining the history of
securitization).
266. Indeed, it is the age-old sale-leaseback transaction that transforms Fl's assets into cash
(which Fl then pays as dividends to its shareholders), yet there does not appear to be any obvious
pattern of companies engaging in such transactions for judgment proofing.
267. See note 91 supra and accompanying text (explaining that once Fl's liabilities are equal
to its assets, an increase in liabilities would not increase a).
268. See notes 162-252 supra and accompanying text (explaining that F2 and F3 may become
subject to all of Fl's liabilities, and that those liabilities can be avoided simply by adequately capitalizing Fl).
269. Whether existing regulation is the most efficient is beyond the scope of this article.
Nonetheless, I offer the following observations. The objective of regulating judgment proofing
should be to internalize its costs to the parties participating in it. Those parties are then more likely
to take the socially optimal level of care, and judgment proofing is less likely to impose health-care
and welfare costs. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172 (4th ed. 1932) (arguing that
the failure of companies to internalize their costs will cause a divergence between the values of the
marginal private net product entailed with the companies' activities and the social net product);
STEVEN SHAVELL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 22-23 (1987) (arguing that the socially optimal behavior of injurers can be determined by finding the level of care that minimizes
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that level is presently socially acceptable, it is likely to remain so in the future.
CONCLUSION

The claim that innovative business transactions will kill liability is simply wrong. Liability is not dying, nor is the system by which money judgments are enforced beginning to fail. Arguments to the contrary blur the
distinction between structuring business transactions and the unrelated step
of paying dividends and ignore that, in arm's length transactions, any transferred value ,vill be replaced by an equivalent value or better. Those arguments therefore present a world other than the ordinary commercial world in
which we live.
Judgment proofing can best be analyzed by separating arm's length
transactions from non-arm's length transactions based on the different motivations, perspectives, and costs inherent in each. In an arm's length transaction, each company seeks independent gain; whereas in a non-arm's length

total accident costs incurred each time injurers engage in their activities and then raising the activity
level as long as utility outweighs injury costs). There is, however, an inherent problem with the
traditional ways of internalizing judgment proofing costs: Even if Fl's liability is extended to F2
and F3, their assets may be insufficient to pay all the costs. Because costs cannot be quantified ex
ante, it is impossible to adequately capitalize any given company to ensure that its costs will be
internalized. Government could, of course, require highly conservative levels of capitalization, but
that would make U.S. companies uncompetitive in a global marketplace. In this context, it is interesting to compare the experience with bank capital requirements. In 1985, the U.S. Federal Reserve
Board imposed minimum capital requirements on U.S. banks. See Camille M. Caesar, CapitalBased Regulation and U.S. Banking Reform, 101 YALE L.J. 1525, 1534-35 (1992). The main objectives were to strengthen the financial position of U.S. banks, to enhance the security of bank
liabilities, and to shield the U.S. deposit insurance safety net from excessive risk taking. See id. at
1530. Regulators were concerned, however, that the cost of complying \vith these requirements
would create a competitive disadvantage for U.S. banks as against foreign banks. See id. at 1539.
In response, U.S. regulators lobbied central banks in other countries to adopt uniform international
minimum capital requirements, culminating in the adoption in 1988 of the Basle Accord which
imposes a minimum capital/risk-weighted asset ratio of 8% for international banks. See Hal S.
Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885,885
(1995). There is, however, another solution that, absent global regulation, has been useful in other
contexts. By pooling the potential liabilities of many companies, it is statistically more feasible to
match the assets to liabilities. The traditional way of accomplishing this is liability insurance,
which could be made mandatory. But mandatory insurance may not be feasible in industries where
large liability claims are likely and therefore statistical risk is harder to manage. There, the government could require companies to collectively internalize their liabilities by creating a mandatory
fund, paid for by companies in each industry, to compensate involuntary creditors. There is significant precedent for doing this to protect employee pensions and also to protect against environmental
and nuclear liability. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1082 (1999); Price-Anderson Amendment Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994 & Supp.
1999). For a descriptive economic analysis of these and similar alternatives, see EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 108, at 60-62.
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transaction, judgment proofing only needs to benefit the controlling company.
Arm's length business transactions, no matter how innovative, are unlikely to be used for judgment proofing. A sale-leaseback, the threshold
transaction that gives rise to arm's length judgment proofing, is taxable.
Even if a company (Fl) seeking to judgment-proof itself is willing to pay
those taxes and to compensate an unrelated company (F2) to buy its assets
and lease them back, the companies are unlikely to agree on compensation
because inherent costs are apt to make judgment proofing more expensive for
F2 than is valuable for Fl. As well as being an economically dubious strategy, arm's length judgment proofing introduces risks of adverse publicity,
job loss, and personal civil and criminal liability, which managers of F2 will
seek to avoid.
Social psychology strengthens this economic analysis. Research has
shown that people's risk attitudes toward a particular task depend on whether
they perceive a potential gain or loss from engaging in the task. Tasks for
which a person perceives potential gains typically produce risk-averse behavior; tasks for which a person perceives potential losses yield risk-seeking
behavior. Because arm's length transactions are voluntary, F2 presumably
would enter into arm's length judgment proofing transactions, if at all, solely
for gain. F2 therefore would be risk averse in negotiating the terms of the
transaction, increasing the difficulty of agreeing on a mutually acceptable
level of compensation. Also, because the costs of judgment proofing could
be devastating, F2 is unlikely to discount these costs, even given the uncertainty of their infliction: Loss aversion predicts that risk-averse personssuch as F2-tend to assign too much weight to events that have a low probability of occurrence, when the consequences of such events are extremely
adverse.
Non-arm's length judgment proofing, on the other hand, is more likely to
occur. Because Fl and F2 are related companies, and therefore may be part
of the same consolidated tax group, a sale-leaseback between them ,vill not
be subject to federal taxation. Furthermore, F3's motivation for judgment
proofing Fl would be to avoid losses from future involuntary claims. Loss
aversion predicts that F3 will be more likely to take risks to achieve that
goal. However, the legal system historically has responded to these risks
through a range of restrictions that tend to discourage non-arm's length
judgment proofing. Empirical data suggest that these restrictions are sufficient. Furthermore, where existing law fails as an ex ante deterrent to judgment proofing, it still may have an ex post remedial impact by requiring F2
and F3 to pay F l' s liabilities.

Nov. 1999]

JUDGMENT PROOFING

53

Existing constraints on judgment proofing therefore already appear adequate, and the law is likely to evolve additional restrictions as necessary.
Accordingly, there is no need to implement radical reform or other regulatory responses. Indeed, to do so could indiscriminately restrict the value
creation-"wealth, jobs, incomes, and new products for large numbers of
people"27°-that comes with business and financial innovation.271

270. Paul Craig Roberts, Who Did More/or Mankind, Mother Teresa or Mike Milken?, Bus.

WK., Mar. 2, 1998, at 28 (arguing that creating wealth, jobs, incomes, and new products for large
numbers of people is at least as important as redistributing wealth, and referring to arguments to
that effect by philosopher David Kelley).
271. The Securities and Exchange Commission in fact recently removed inadvertent regulatory barriers to securitization-the type of business innovation most criticized-in order to "accommodate future innovations in the structured finance market." Investment Company Act Release
No. 19105, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1185,062, at 83,501 (Nov. 19, 1992)
(provided in connection with the issuance of Rule 3a-7 under the Investment Company Act of
1940).

